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Theory alone cannot accurately describe the characteristics of successful natural 
resource governance institutions. Laboratory economic experiments are needed to 
analyze the characteristics and validate theories in a controlled environment. Three such 
experiments on important, but frequently overlooked, aspects of institutions are reported: 
time allowed for decision-making, the strength of property rights, and how resource user 
groups impact each other. Chapter 1 analyzes how psychology can impact outcomes in 
institutions by forcing subjects to make decisions under time pressure, something not 
before analyzed in a dynamic Common Pool Resource management context. We find 
users under time pressure make decisions which reduce the sustainability of shared 
renewable resources. How adding parties to bargaining affects outcomes is addressed in 
Chapter 2, which finds efficiency is not reduced when there are no property rights. In 
fact, adding a third party to a bargain promotes more efficient outcomes in negotiations 
between two parties something traditional theory does not predict. The impact is robust to 
the completeness of the information participants have available. Chapter 3 is motivated 
by a lack of research on how Common Pool Resource management regimes perform 
when different groups of users interact. My experiment discovers the impacts 
neighboring user groups have on each other. While self-managing shared resources can 
lead to better outcomes, neighboring groups have a negative impact on each other. Such 
externalities had not been determined by previous field research on CPRs nor had they 
been deduced theoretically. Experimental examinations of three aspects of resource 
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Manuscript Format is in use in the following chapters. Chapter 1 was submitted on 
30 September 2017, accepted 15 March 2018, and published by Nature Sustainability 18 
April 2018. Chapter 2 is intended for submission to the American Economic Journal: 
Microeconomics. Chapter 3 is intended for submission to the Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management. All three chapters describe the findings of laboratory 
economic experiments. 
Chapter 1 investigates the impact of time pressure on the management of a common 
pool resource. Survival analysis results indicate sustainable management becomes less 
likely when users are forced to make decisions under time pressure. 
Chapter 2 examines the impact property rights have on bargaining outcomes. In a 
context of no legal property rights, I vary the number of people able to take a good from 
its owner and the information players have about the value of the good to each other. I 
find the addition of a second taker improves our measure for economic outcomes and 
incomplete information does not have a significant impact. 
Chapter 3 determines the impacts of self-managing fishery management 
organizations. Self-managing groups perform better than suboptimally exogenously 
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We test how fast and slow thought processes affect cooperation for sustainability by 
manipulating time pressure in a dynamic common pool resource experiment. Sustainable 
management of shared resources critically depends on decisions in the current period to 
leave enough stock so that future generations are able to draw upon the remaining limited 
natural resources. An intertemporal common pool resource game represents a typical 
dynamic for social dilemmas involving natural resources. Using one such game, we 
analyse decisions throughout time. We find that people in this context deplete the 
common resource to a greater extent under time pressure, which leads to greater 
likelihood of stock collapse. Preventing resource collapse while managing natural 
resources requires actively creating decision environments that facilitate the cognitive 
capacity needed to support sustainable cooperation. 
 
Overextraction of natural resources in the present can lead to negative consequences for 
society and is at odds with most definitions of sustainable development (1). According to 
Pearson (2), "the core of the idea of sustainability is the concept that current decisions 
should not damage prospects for maintaining or improving living standards in the future.” 
Essential for sustainability and important to many aspects of human and animal behavior 
(3-6) is cooperation. Societies with imperfect, incomplete, and shared property rights face 
social dilemmas characterized by conflict between individual and collective interests. 
Cooperative solutions in social dilemmas require individuals to overcome selfish myopic 
incentives to achieve better social outcomes. Across many social dilemmas, myopic 
resource use often yields immediate, tangible, and easy to understand benefits; while 
long-term cooperative and sustainable stewardship of the resource involves more thought, 
planning, and coordination, along with benefits that are less certain and harder to 
calculate (7). Understanding how cognitive pressures influence common pool resource 
(CPR) outcomes is vital for designing interventions to prevent resource collapse and 




Effective stewardship of the commons requires understanding how institutions 
and cognitive factors contribute to cooperation.  An expansive literature considers which 
institutions can establish cooperation in CPRs and why these institutions work (8-12). 
While institutions have been rigorously explored in relation to CPRs, less is known about 
what cognitive factors and decision environments produce sustainable cooperation in 
CPRs.  One particularly salient question is: do fast (intuitive) or slow (deliberative) 
thought processes better support sustainable use of a common pool resource? We find 
experimental evidence that groups drawing on a common pool resource are less likely to 
cooperate under time pressure. Instead, a slower, more deliberative, decision process 
supports cooperation which extends the life of the common pool resource and improves 
social welfare.   
Our experiment uses time pressure manipulation on an intertemporal CPR. While 
much of the previous experimental work on social dilemmas and cognition has focused 
on one-shot games, natural resources are often characterized as stock variables (ex. 
wetlands, fisheries, groundwater) which are not independent of human behavior in 
previous periods. These natural assets also cannot be easily regenerated if collapse 
occurs. By tracking a stock of resources in our experiment we can evaluate when group 
behavior causes collapse of the resource which is paramount in understanding sustainable 
development, the reconciliation of society’s goals and limits of the earth’s natural 
resources (13,14). We have found only one other intertemporal experiment using time 
pressure which examines intertemporal preferences (15) and no previous experiments 
involving intertemporal social dilemmas and cognitive manipulations, such as time 
pressure. The dynamic CPR game we employ allows us to determine how cognitive 
scarcity, that is present in each decision time frame, impacts the depletion and survival of 
shared stocks over time.  Our experiment further tests whether fast and slow thought 
processes behave similarly in dynamic CPRs to one-shot social dilemmas. 
Common pool resource decisions – and resource decisions in general – are 
frequently made by individuals who face cognitive constraints. For example, the 
condition of poverty inhibits farmers’ ability to make good decisions due to cognitive 
resources being consumed by financial concerns, an equivalent of losing 13 IQ points 




mental resources (17). Recent research suggests that scarcities of time and money focus 
our cognitive system on these particular scarcities, leaving little cognitive bandwidth left 
to solve other problems (18-20). This may make an escape from poverty more difficult, 
as the condition of poverty causes poor communities to heavily discount future 
consequences of extraction behavior: cognitive scarcities contribute to poverty traps (21).  
One efficient strategy when faced with cognitive constraints is to apply heuristics, fast 
and simple rules, which simplify the decision environment. These strategies adopted by 
subjects in dynamic CPRs under limited cognitive resources could have important 
implications to the sustainability of natural resources.   
It is common for experimenters to use time pressure to shine a light on the innate 
thought processes of individuals. As a cognitive constraint, time pressure is used to 
distinguish between fast instinctive strategies and slow deliberative strategies in the dual 
process theory of cognition (22-26). Through applying time pressure to participants’ 
decisions we can determine if fast, instinctive strategies are more sustainable than slow, 
deliberative ones.   
There are two types of cooperation in a game theoretic setting: pure cooperation, 
which is cooperation when defection strictly maximizes payoffs (ex. one-shot social 
dilemma games), and strategic cooperation, which is cooperation that can be long-run 
payoff maximizing depending on the choices of others (ex. coordination games). 
Previous studies find evidence of increased cooperation under time pressure in one-shot 
social dilemmas (27-30). Viewed through a dual process theory of cognition this 
cooperation is observed when people sometimes adopt a cooperative heuristic in social 
dilemmas. This dual process theory of cooperation is stated in the Social Heuristics 
Hypothesis (SHH) (5,6,31). SHH predicts that deliberation can undermine pure 
cooperation but may support strategic cooperation if the context is sensitive for intuitive 
thought processes (31). Under certain distributional assumptions of deliberation costs, 
intuitive defectors may use deliberation to switch to cooperation when future 
repercussions exist (32). A recent meta-study (30) finds evidence for the prediction of 
increased cooperation in social dilemmas when people rely more on intuitive thought 
processes and also finds no effects on cooperation of cognitive manipulation (ex. time 




a recent study finding decreased cooperation with time pressure which is attributed to 
confusion (33). According to SHH, deliberation would either have no effect or increase 
cooperation in our setting because cooperation can be payoff maximizing over the life of 
the common pool resource, similar to a coordination game. Our experiment adds a new 
perspective to the observed behavior of individuals subjected to cognitive scarcities in a 
dynamic social dilemma.      
Utilizing a between-subject comparison test (between participants under time 
pressure and participants without a time constraint) we find participants behave more 
myopically when limited by time constraints, which is consistent with SHH. Thus, 
common pool resources have a higher probability of failure when managed by people 
under cognitive scarcities, a finding which contrasts the findings from previous time 
pressure experiments. We explore three potential reasons for this result which include: 
errors in judgment (34,35), slow adjustment of extraction strategies during the game (36), 
and intuitive heuristics for myopic extraction (5,6,31). Our results highlight the benefits 
of examining intertemporal dynamics over one-shot games to understand how cognition 
and cooperation unfolds to promote sustainable development. 
 
Dynamic CPR Model 
There are numerous economic experiments with dynamic CPRs that investigate different 
institutions which propagate cooperation (37,38). Our experiment uses a dynamic CPR 
model used by Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (39). This model considers an inexhaustible 
private resource and an exhaustible shared resource. Socially optimal resource 
exploitation in this game requires drawing heavily from the shared resource early and 
preserving it as time passes. In each period, n players simultaneously remove tokens from 
an inexhaustible private account and a shared exhaustible group account with the 
constraint that only 60 tokens in total can be taken in a period. Tokens from the group 
account are worth twice as much as tokens from the individual account. Each group 
member i chooses the number of tokens to extract, , from the group account at time t. 
The sum of the group members extraction is  = ∑ 	 . The group account acts as the 
stock of a common pool resource in the experiment and the private account acts as the 




The group account replenishes at a rate, β, each period, multiplied by the 
difference between the remaining group account balance and a maximum size of the 
group account, 
 . Thus the group account, 
, evolves over time according to the 
following formula: 
 = 
	 − 	 + (
 − 
	 − 	). The size of the group 
account in the present period directly depends on the size of the group account in the past 
round and the decisions made by group members in that round. To realize regrowth of the 
group account, groups must maintain a group account level above a threshold, . 
Whenever the group account is reduced below this threshold there ceases to be any 
regrowth in the group account and the resource collapses.  In our experiment β was set at 
0.25, the minimum threshold, , was set equal to 30 tokens, and 
  was set to 360 tokens. 
We parameterize a relatively small regrowth rate in our experiment so that the 
symmetrical Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) is to exhaust the resource as fast 
as possible though gains for the group can be higher if they do not exhaust the resource. 
The socially optimal strategy in this game is to maintain the group account indefinitely to 
prevent the collapse of the group account. The path of the socially optimal extraction 
depends on the parameters of the experiment and consists of a set of group account 
dependent choice rules, detailed in the Methods section.  
This model describes situations where societies discover a virgin resource, extract 
much of it, and then attempt to jointly conserve the remaining resource. The presence of a 
threshold, below which the stock will not regenerate, is also a pillar of ecological theory 




Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of the average group account (stock) size for time 
pressure and non-time pressure groups. The lower stock path of time pressure groups 
indicates greater extraction and lower survival rates of group accounts in the time 
pressure treatments as compared to those under no time pressure. This suggests that time 
pressure leads to less cooperation and shorter survival of the common resource.  
We use a Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the treatment effect of time 
pressure on the probability of failure of the group account.  This method of survival 




probability of an event, such as death or relapse, and in economics and political science 
to evaluate duration data (41-44). The model is appropriate to analyze the event of failure 
of the group account in our experiment since the timing of collapse is a type of duration 
data.  
 Analysis at the individual level in Table 1.1 suggests an effect from the 
imposition of time pressure (group level analysis is provided in Supplementary Table 1). 
We find that individuals exposed to time pressure face an increased rate of failure of 
101.3% (2.013 = .,  < 0.01) over the control group in Table 1.1, column 2.  This 
is sometimes referred to as the hazard ratio in survival analysis studies. A similar pattern 
is present for individual differences in Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). An increase in 
correctly answered CRT questions reduced the rate of group account failure by 79% 
(p<0.05). The coefficient on the percentage of CRT questions answered correctly 
indicates that participants who do not repress their intuitive thought process induce a 
greater probability of failure of the group account.  This finding is also consistent with 
the average treatment effects of time pressure. The rate of increase in hazard ratio is 
roughly equivalent across time periods with the difference in hazard ratios being 
proportional, which is an important assumption in the Cox proportional hazards model.  
The results suggest that time pressure significantly increases the failure rate of the group 
account in the intertemporal CPR game which adds a different finding from much of the 
existing literature on cooperation and intuitive decisions in one-shot social dilemmas. 
  
Extraction Behavior  
We also explain the effect of time pressure on the deviation of observed extraction from 
the optimal extraction behavior ( !""# %& '!" (&)!& * −
%+,)-. (&)!& *). We analyze this difference in extraction behavior because the 
socially optimal extraction path is group account dependent and incorporates the level of 
the group account as a decision making variable that is nonlinearly related to extraction 
decisions.  Using a simpler extraction measure, like the number of group tokens 
extracted, may be misleading as participants adjust to changing group account levels 




before exhaustion of the group account since the observed behavior after exhaustion is 
trivial.  
 In Table 1.2 we find that time pressure induces greater extraction than the control 
group.  A negative coefficient indicates the variable increases extraction relative to the 
social optimal, which in turn would increase the relative risk of collapse of the resource. 
The treatment effect is statistically weak without any controls, which suggests the time 
within game is important to the size of the treatment effect. As a robustness check, the SI 
reports results including subjects and groups who violated the time limit to test whether 
results are explained by systematic differences between the participants who meet the 
time constraint versus those who do not (Supplementary Table 3). In some one-shot 
games there is a loss of support for intuitive cooperation when including these 
participants. We find attenuated estimates of our treatment effect, though they are still 
statistically significant with the inclusion of all participants. We also take a further look 
at round differences in Supplementary Table 4. The coefficient on time pressure is 
negative though the coefficient on CRT score is not statistically significant. Combined 
with our survival analyses (Table 1.1, and Supplementary Tables 2, 3, and 4) this gives us 
some confidence that the cognitive scarcities in the dynamic common pool resource game 
induce less cooperative behavior and increase the risk of group account failure through 
greater myopic extraction.   
 
Discussion 
 Our results indicate one domain in which intuitive judgment under limited 
cognitive resources leads to more myopic behavior, to the detriment of the individual and 
group welfare. We find in an intertemporal social dilemma game, participants with 
cognitive scarcities have a propensity to extract more from a shared resource stock. This 
result provides empirical evidence of when individuals are deliberatively cooperative, 
which has previously drawn almost exclusively on static social dilemma experiments 
(5,27,28). In an intertemporal setting, individuals require the cognitive bandwidth for 





 Since many common pool resource situations are intertemporal in nature, our 
results are more germane to these contexts than those of traditional one-shot games 
(27,28). Such one-shot games are limited in their ability to capture the development of 
intertemporal dynamics, which can have large impacts on sustainable development. In 
one-shot games the logical action is to extract as much as possible. However, in 
intertemporal games with repeated interactions cooperating in maintaining the resource 
becomes a more viable strategy (45); a phenomenon which helps explain the success of 
some common pool resource management programs (46). So it is interesting that the 
imposition of time pressure decreases the probability of survival of group accounts in our 
experiment, which suggests these CPR success stories were in spite of intuitively myopic 
behavior. 
  We explore three potential reasons for the contrast between our results and those 
of prior static non-cooperative games. The first possibility is that people make more 
mistakes when confronted with a difficult problem under time pressure (34, 35). Such 
stochastic mistakes may increase the variance in play from participants and the group 
account may be inadvertently exhausted. To evaluate the variation in extraction behavior 
we compare the absolute value of the deviation of extraction decisions between rounds 
(/+,"0& 1- !& * = | , − ,	| ) in Supplementary Figure 1. A greater value of 
the absolute deviation from the time pressure treatment would indicate that stochastic 
behavior, or random mistakes, may play some role in additional failure of groups in the 
survival analysis.  Our results suggest that stochasticity in choice is similar between time 
pressure treatments.  This however does not suggest that other mean shifting errors in 
extraction do not exist. 
  A second explanation for the departure from past one-shot game results is that the 
design of the game encourages large extraction decisions at the beginning of the game 
and cooperation requires restraining extraction behavior once the group account nears the 
threshold for failure. The initial extraction behavior could induce inertia in participants 
under time pressure leading to a slower adaptation to optimal levels of extraction. Alós-
Ferrer et al. (36) found that inertia as an automatic process conflicts with a more rational 
deliberative one, consistent with the dual process view of decision making. We can use 




extraction behavior. A smaller absolute value of the difference in extraction decisions 
indicates greater inertia in extraction decisions. We find no difference in inertia between 
time pressure treatments, which puts serious doubts on inertia as an explanation for 
increased extraction and greater failure of CPRs (Supplementary Figure 1). 
 A third explanation, the main hypothesis for interpretation of these results, is that 
the dynamic aspect of the game affects intuitive cooperation among subjects. The data 
from our experiment supports the proposition of quick and fast myopic behavior in the 
commons. Our finding is consistent with the SHH (5,6), wherein deliberation can 
sometimes increase cooperation in settings where cooperating can be a long run payoff-
maximizing strategy. Such an increase in cooperation can be favored by natural selection 
or learning – and thus is expected to occur – if cooperation is typically long-run 
advantageous and intuition is sufficiently sensitive to context (31), or if most interactions 
are one-shot and the distribution of deliberation costs satisfies certain conditions 
(32).  Deliberation promotes cooperation when it leads people to attend to the features of 
the dynamic CPR which realize cooperation as a more efficient strategy.  If people only 
really confront the nature of the collapsing resource when they have time, deliberation 
would override myopic impulses.   
 Many decisions in our society can be characterized as dynamic choices under 
cognitive scarcities. Our research provides insights into instinctive human behavior, 
enabling us to shed light on whether humans behave more myopically under temporally 
dynamic common pool resource scenarios with quick and fast decision processes. This 
may well mean that cooperation in the commons is more difficult to sustain because of 
intuitively myopic behavior and the use of policy tools becomes even more important to 
combat over-extraction in the commons. It is also unclear how to provide the cognitive 
bandwidth necessary to support cooperative behavior since it can be presented through a 
combination of factors, though efforts to mitigate these stressors for individuals operating 
in a common pool resource context could provide an important support tool to sustainable 
collective management. 
 The results also highlight the implications of generalizing results of one-shot 
games to situations that involve intertemporal trade-offs, or repeat interactions, when 




exploring cognitive processes of human behavior and sustainability. To evaluate the 
importance of deliberation in thought processes to cooperation in common pool resources 
more aspects of these games need to be explored.  Specifically, there is a need to 
investigate how group size, uncertainty in natural systems, and institutions affect the 





A total of 120 undergraduate students were recruited at a public university in the 
northeastern United States and paid based on their performance in the game. Participants 
played three cycles of the intertemporal CPR game in the Spring and Fall of 2016, a cycle 
is one set of rounds of the same CPR game with the same group.  In each cycle, a 
participant extracted tokens from a group account shared with 3 other anonymous 
participants (a representative decision screen is shown in Supplementary Figure 4). The 
last round (decision period) in each game was randomly predetermined and not 
communicated to the participants to avoid last round effects. Participants were randomly 
and anonymously regrouped after each cycle into a new group.  
Participants received a show-up fee of $10 and the average payout at the end of 
the game was $18.70. The payout was based on each individual token taken from the 
private account yielding a return of 0.8 cents while the tokens taken from the public 
account yielded 1.6 cents each. The economic experiment software Z-tree (47) was used 
to run the experiment. There were three cycles in the experiment with a predetermined 
fixed length; the first cycle lasted 12 rounds, the second cycle lasted 15 rounds, and the 
third cycle lasted 8 rounds. Participants were not told how many rounds to expect or that 
there would be multiple cycles during the experiment. 
Prior to the game, participants answered a three question Cognitive Reflection 
Test (CRT) (shown in Supplementary Figure 3) under a 90 second time constraint (48). 
The Cognitive Reflection Test can determine whether participants can suppress an 




intuitive thinking) and employ a slower and more reflective cognitive process (“System 
2” processes requiring mental effort and reasoning) when making decisions. If a subject 
did not answer all three of the CRT questions before the end of the 90 seconds then they 
were recorded as having not finished the CRT and as having answered none of the 
questions correct. 
In addition to the CRT, participants answered demographic questions (as shown 
in Supplementary Figure 2). Next participants were given instructions about the dynamic 
CPR game (a representative copy of these instructions is provided in the Supplementary 
Information). The experimenter read the instructions to the participants, who were 
required to correctly answer 3 comprehension questions to confirm their understanding of 
the game. Experience with other economic experiments, time to complete the 
comprehension questions, CRT scores, gender ratios, and areas of study of the subjects 
were similar between treatment and control groups.  Indicators for whether a participant 
was majoring in environmental economics or biology were included because of the 
potential for effects from their educational program of choice on their decisions. 
The participants in half of the experimental sessions were exposed to time 
pressure constraints with a 7-second per round decision time limit. This constraint was 
chosen because the decision times of subjects within sessions without time pressure 
indicated that it would be a binding constraint for the majority of them. There was a clock 
visible to subjects counting down the time and the decision screen disappeared after the 
7-second limit was reached. Time pressure was instituted by requiring participants to 
make extraction decisions within 7-seconds, and if the time constraint was violated then 
the participants earned zero tokens (public or private) for that round. When subjects 
violate the 7-second time limit no tokens are taken from the group account for that 
subject. To ensure differences in extraction decisions are active choices rather than 
inaction, 31 out of 2,440 observations where subjects do not make a decision within the 
time constraint are excluded in the analysis. Similarly, 16 out of 90 groups with a subject 
who did not enter an extraction decision within the time constraint are excluded from the 
survival analysis so that any interdependency between that zero-extraction observation 
and overall survival is not biased. Most participants in sessions without a time constraint 




the 7-second time constraint was binding on average); we find the difference in mean 
decision time between treatment and control groups is statistically significant at the 1% 
level using a Mann-Whitney two sample statistic test.   
We employ a series of statistical tests to estimate the treatment effect of time 
pressure and the effect of greater CRT scores on cooperative behavior to understand the 
cognitive underpinnings of cooperation in a dynamic CPR. 
In the model for the dynamic game, the size of the group account (stock) in the 
present period directly depends on the size of the group stock in the past period and the 
decisions made by group members in the past period. In our experiment β was set at 0.25 
and, , was set at a stock size of 30 tokens (if the stock size fell below 30 tokens, the 
group account would not regenerate lost tokens).  
There exists a myopic strategy in this game which is the Subgame Perfect Nash 
Equilibrium (SPNE), wherein each player extracts the maximum amount until the group 
account is depleted. In the SPNE, forward-looking individual agents consider the trade-
off between assured present benefits and uncertain future benefits (measured in terms of 
tokens extracted from the group account). This SPNE depends on the parameters of the 
experiment, primarily the relative values of , , and n.  Specifically, when < 3(	)4 3  , or 
regrowth of the resource is relatively small, there is an SPNE where it is optimal for 
individuals to exhaust the resource, which is established in the Supplementary 
Information. Here we demonstrate the SPNEs for our specific parameterization. The level 
of effort, , exerted by individual i at time t is equivalent to the number of group tokens 
extracted in the experiment.  The maximum effort, ̅, is the total amount of effort the 
participant has available to extract from the group account. If  > 3(	)4 3  and  ≤ ̅ the 
SPNE decision rule is such that we retrieve a set of decision rules that are dependent on 
the size of the stock in the previous round.  The set of decision rules are: choose  = ̅ 
if the resource stock is 
	 ≥ *̅ + ;  = 49:;3  if 
	 ∈ =, *̅ + ) ;   = 49:;  if 

	 < ;  = min A̅, 49:; B if 
	 < *̅ + .  These results indicate the symmetric 
stock specific extraction paths by all participants of a group and mimic the social 
planner’s extraction path.  These rules indicate that when the regrowth rate of the stock is 




benefits of future periods of the stock and the growth of that stock.  When the regrowth 
rate is relatively small and  < 3(	)4 3  and  ≤ ̅ then the optimal decision rule is to 
extract  = min {̅, 4}.  This extraction path drives the stock to extinction and is similar 
to the Nash Equilibrium in the prisoner’s dilemma game. The proof of the optimal 
decision rule for our experiment can be found in the Supplementary Notes of our SI. In 
our parameterization, with a low regrowth rate of the stock, the SPNE decision rule is to 
extract  = min {̅, 4}. Though multiple equilibria can exist, invoking the Folk Theorem 
(41), if subjects are sufficiently patient the SPNE can coincide with the social optimal 
path of extraction. Through the lens of SHH, the Folk Theorem could operationalize 
strategic cooperation because individuals can maximize their own payoffs through 
cooperation. This is true if individuals are patient and expect future gains in later time 
periods provided others cooperate, as current period cooperative decisions are more likely 
to sustain later cooperation. For certain values of the parameters , , and n the selfish 
SPNE could also coincide with the socially optimal strategy. For instance, when regrowth 
of the group account is relatively high the private benefits from cooperating with group 
members can outweigh the private benefits from extracting the resource to collapse, 
therefore creating a game where social cooperation and the SPNE are equivalent. 
 In our experiment, the group account starts with 360 tokens in it and each group 
token extracted is subtracted from the total amount of tokens in the account. After each 
round of decision making, the resource stock grows according to the formula (360 - X)/4 
tokens, where X is the stock of group tokens. Therefore, at the beginning of the next 
period, there will be X + (360 - X)/4 tokens in the group account. If the total number of 
tokens in the group account ever falls to fewer than 30 tokens, the threshold , the group 
account will cease to replenish. 
 
Econometric Methodology  
Survival analysis is the appropriate tool to analyze the time to exhaustion of the group 
account. Ordinary linear regression would require that the group exhaustion times be 




Therefore, survival analysis is more appropriate in our context rather than ordinary linear 
regression (44). 
The semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards regression describes the 
dependence of failure risk at any time, t, on the covariates in the regression (41). The Cox 
model is popular, flexible, and does not assume specific probability distributions until 
events occur, leading to the advantage of not needing to parameterize time dependency 
(43). The Cox proportional hazards model is the most commonly used modeling 
procedure for survival/censored data and covariates. 
In the Cox proportional hazards model, E(&) is the survivor function, E(&) =
F) (& ≤ G) and H(&) is the hazard at time t, where H(&) = lim∆→ LM (NOPQ∆|OR)∆ = S(T).  
We can use a set of k covariates in X and recover the coefficients of vector  which tell 
us about the hazard of failure for a specific covariate. The hazard rate is H(&|T) =
H(&)UV, where  is a px1 vector of unknown coefficients and H(&) is an unknown 
function for the baseline cumulative hazard function when X=0. The hazard ratio is 
thus H(&)/H(&) and "* X Y()YZ()[ = T. This holds for all individuals so that 
"* Y\()Y]()= (T̂ − T) for individuals i and j. 
In the Cox model, baseline hazard rates vary over time, but the hazards for 
different covariate values are assumed to be proportional or constant over time. The 
proportions are also assumed to hold for all periods of t and between all individuals (42). 
The Cox proportional hazards model implies that an independent variable shifts the 
hazard by a factor of proportionality. This time invariant proportionality assumption 
implies that the size of that effect remains the same irrespective of when it occurs. If this 
assumption is violated, the outcomes can be significantly biased coefficient estimates 
(and reduced power from significance tests, leading to inefficient estimates) and therefore 
overestimated or underestimated variable impacts (42).  We test for proportionality using 
Schoenfeld and Deviance residuals and find that for our data the proportionality 
assumption holds. 
 We use the Breslow approximation to handle ties in event times. It is the simplest 
approximation to the probability that an individual had an event, given that an event 




estimates coefficients too close to zero) and was chosen for such (44). In addition, we 
cluster standard errors in our analysis by the unit of observation.  Observations at the 
individual subject level can have errors which are correlated and therefore clustering is a 
common technique for statistical inference of the significance of the recovered 
coefficients.   
 In Table 1.2 we present ordinary linear regressions of the deviation of extraction 
decisions to the social optimal extraction decision, including a series of controls.  The 
dependent variable is constructed to compare the observed extraction to a stock 
dependent decision which is deemed cooperative and socially optimal. We define this 
difference as 1 SS =  !" %& '!" (&)!& * − %+,)-. (&)!& * . This is 
then used in equation (1) to evaluate the coefficient on the treatment effect of time 
pressure. 
 
1 SS =  + 	F),,0) +  _…aT,_…a + b      (1) 
 
Equation 1 includes k covariates to control for other factors that affect decisions such as 
round in the experiment, gender of the participant, cycle, the experience with economic 
experiments of participants, undergraduate major, and CRT score. We cluster standard 
errors in our analysis by subject to adjust for correlation of observations by subject in the 
experiment.  The interpretation of negative coefficient of time pressure is that the effect 
of the time pressure treatment increased extraction from the group account and 
participants behaved more selfishly compared to the control group.  
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Table 1.1: Survival Analysis 
 Dependent variable: 
 Failure of Group Account 





 (0.134) (0.149) (0.171) 
Female  0.214 0.334** 
  (0.133) (0.164) 
# of previous experiments  -0.005 0.011 
  (0.084) (0.085) 
UG major: biology  -0.412** -0.423* 
  (0.180) (0.220) 
UG major: environmental economics  -0.001 -0.109 
  (0.179) (0.209) 
Cycle 2  -0.164 -0.158 
  (0.165) (0.198) 
Cycle 3  -0.540*** -0.530** 
  (0.181) (0.209) 
% CRT Correct   -0.583* 
   (0.299) 
Observations 2,148 2,148 1,545 
Log pseudolikelihood -1,000 -993 -688 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Cox proportional hazard model results, with stock failure as the event of 
interest. Clustered standard errors by participant, cycle, and session are in parentheses. Column (1) and (2) 
contain the full sample of all individuals while column (3) restricts the sample to include only individuals 














Table 1.2: Extraction Behavior 
 Dependent variable: 
 (SO Extraction – Observed Extraction) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Pressure -1.079 -4.973* -6.695** 
 (2.502) (2.831) (3.088) 
Female  -3.431 -6.163* 
  (2.781) (3.311) 
# of previous experiments  1.633 1.627 
  (1.633) (1.555) 
UG major: biology  2.269 3.509 
  (2.665) (3.045) 
UG major: environmental economics  -4.078 -5.184 
  (3.883) (4.578) 
Cycle 2  2.432 2.105 
  (1.626) (1.799) 
Cycle 3  2.979* 2.443 
  (1.720) (2.052) 
Round  -1.781*** -1.731*** 
  (0.196) (0.231) 
% CRT Correct   -0.087 
   (6.841) 
Observations 1,952 1,952 1,400 
R-squared 0.000 0.107 0.126 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Ordinary least squares regression. Clustered standard errors by 
participant are in parentheses. Groups with participants who do not enter a decision within the time 
constraint are excluded from the analysis. Column (1) and (2) contains the full sample of all individuals 
while column (3) restricts the sample to include only individuals with a CRT score. “UG major:” indicates 




















To be considered for submission to American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 
EFFICIENCY WITHOUT PROPERTY RIGHTS 
DO MORE THIEVES LEAD TO MORE THEFT? 
by 
Chris Brozyna 
Environmental and Natural Resource Economics 
University of Rhode Island 






In an experiment where players can take goods from their owner, we find adding a 
second taker to the situation reduces the incentive of the first taker to rob the owner. The 
Coase theorem says well-defined property rights and limited parties to a bargain are 
necessary conditions to achieve Pareto efficiency. However, the model of Bar-Gill and 
Persico (2016) argues that additional parties to sequential bargaining do not reduce 
exchange efficiency in the absence of property rights. In an experiment, I find sequential 
bilateral bargaining with an absence of property rights but where the owner can bribe the 
taker to leave, shows an increase in efficiency of 24 percent when a second taker is added 
to the sequential bargaining context. I also investigate the impact of incomplete 
information on the bargaining and find it does not significantly impact economic 
efficiency when there are two takers, only when there is one taker. In contrast to accepted 
knowledge about bargaining, economic efficiency may be possible without strong 
property rights through the presence of additional parties to the bargaining. 
 
I. Introduction 
In traditional Coasean Bargaining analysis economic efficiency depends on clear 
and strong property rights and a limited number of parties to the bargain. For situations 
where property rights are weak or absent such as open-access fisheries or communal 
lands traditional analysis prescribes strengthening or instituting rights. For situations with 
many parties, reduce the number of parties. Because of the influence of the Coase 
Theorem and other economic theories strengthening property rights is now a popular 
policy prescription to many economic issues. This trend is continuing into environmental 
fields. However, it is difficult to institute strong property rights in many contexts. Recent 
models of efficiency and property rights such as Bar-Gill and Persico (2016) challenge 
the traditional analysis’ prescription.  
The insightful model in Bar-Gill and Persico (2016) suggests transforming one-
round grand multilateral bargains to sequential bilateral bargaining does not decrease 
efficiency, regardless of the strength of property rights. Validation of their model is 





Experimental analysis supports the Bar-Gill and Persico argument that additional 
parties outside the bilateral bargaining do not impair efficiency. The presence of a third 
party actually increases exchange efficiency in the absence of property rights. The 
increase is robust to impacts from incomplete information. Adding a second party able to 
take a good away from the good’s owner actually increases relative efficiency by 38.09 
percent. My analysis of a model in which no property rights does not entail economic 
inefficiency provides an important first test of one of the new theories about the 
importance of property rights to bargaining outcomes. 
 
A. Bargaining and Property Rights 
The “Coase theorem” is a central concept of economic theory (Lee 2013). It is 
defined as “assuming the property rights are well defined and that the costs of transacting 
are zero, parties to an externality will resolve the dispute efficiently, and the outcome will 
be unaffected by to which party rights are initially assigned” (Coase 1960; Medema 
2013). Furthermore, increasing the number of parties to a bargain decreases negotiation 
efficiency (Daly 1974; Libecap 2003). A Coasean Bargain is a bargain that occurs in the 
world of the "Coase theorem" to move entitlements from less valued uses to more highly 
valued uses (Knight and Johnson 2011; Libecap 2016; Rapaczynski 1996). In Coasean 
Bargaining literature, “efficient” bargaining resolutions are those maximizing the sum of 
the parties’ economic values (Harrison and McKee 1985; Hoffman and Spitzer 1983). 
Coasean Bargaining is a popular paradigm for considering the achievement of efficient 
outcomes, but it requires strong, well-defined property rights and few parties. 
Property rights is one of the most important and widely-respected ideas, and the 
strengthening of owners’ property rights is one of the goals and tools of many policy 
proposals (Robson and Skaperdas 2008). “Property rights establish the very principle of a 
market” (Spruyt 1996) and not protecting them has been seen as an economic hindrance 
(Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1993). “Property rights” are formally defined through the 
following: “Property is a benefit (or income) stream, and a property right is a claim to a 
benefit stream that some higher body – usually the state – will agree to protect through 




stream” (Bromley 1992)1. Because property rights are the foundation for the modern 
economic system, instituting and strengthening property rights in environmental contexts 
is now popular policy. 
Proposing to improve property rights to achieve economic efficiency is popular, 
but expanding the use of property rights in environmental issues requires further 
investigation. Property rights have become especially important in the context of 
environmental goods, and environmental “bads” (Macinko and Raymond 2001). In the 
ocean for instance, “property rights” is now a common prescription for fisheries 
(Macinko and Bromley 2003). However, “rationalization” of fisheries through the 
institution of property rights has not always led to the expected results (Essington et al. 
2012). Edwards (2008) argues economically efficient outcomes from ocean zoning and 
ownership can occur even in the presence of less than perfect property rights and in the 
context of Coasean contracts. Although the prevailing wisdom has been that strong 
property rights are necessary for efficiency, the idea has recently been challenged for 
environmental issues. 
Although the idea that strong property rights are needed for efficient outcomes 
(Harrison and McKee 1985; Rapaczynski 1996) and for efficient environmental 
management (Feder and Feeny 1991) is popular, recent work has focused on determining 
the effect of weak or nonexistent property rights on bargaining outcomes (Bar-Gill and 
Engel 2016; Bar-Gill and Persico 2016; Croson and Johnston 2000; Glaeser, Ponzetto, 
and Shleifer 2016; Schmitz 2001; Leeson and Nowrasteh 2011). Recently, a paper by 
Bar-Gill and Persico (2016) describes an alternative theoretical model in which high 
economic efficiency occurs in bargaining despite a lack of legal property rights. In the 
absence of strong property rights, the ability to negotiate binding contracts enables 
economic efficiency to occur. I experimentally test the specific predictions of the Bar-
Gill and Persico model. Specifically I test their predictions regarding who will end up 
possessing the bargained good after the negotiation, and the proposals offered.  
Bar-Gill and Persico (2016) introduce a model in which exchange efficiency in 
bargaining is possible without strong property rights. Efficiency is possible in situations 
                                                 
1 There are alternative definitions of property rights (Allen 2015, 1999), however this definition of legal 




with more than 2 parties. In their model, there is a traditional two-party negotiation over a 
good. One of these parties (the taker) can take the good whenever they desire from the 
other (the owner). The owner has a higher valuation of the good and already possesses it. 
However, the owner lacks strong property rights over the good. After the first bilateral 
negotiation, there is another bilateral negotiation between a new taker and either the first 
taker or the original owner, whoever ends the first negotiation with the good. Each party 
makes decisions independently, in a sequential format, so each owner of the good 
negotiates with one potential taker at a time. Each negotiation party knows that because 
of an absence of property rights, in the next period whoever owns the good will have to 
negotiate with another potential taker. Bar-Gill and Persico’s model suggests that without 
strong property rights economically efficient outcomes can occur in bargaining, even 
with multiple people able to take a good from its owner. Because the model’s conclusions 
are at odds with those of traditional theories about negotiating  – which argue more 
parties to a bargain decreases efficiency – it needs to be validated. An experiment testing 
the conclusions would identify whether the model should replace those currently in use, 
or be rejected. The aspect most in need of testing is whether the addition of parties to a 
bargain impairs efficiency. 
The model uses a generalization of the Coase Theorem that does not require a 
single, grand multilateral bargain be struck (Bar-Gill and Persico 2016). A sequence of 
bilateral bargains also achieves exchange efficiency, provided an additional monotonicity 
condition is met. The condition is that agents who value the good more than others, do 
not have weaker protections from takings than those who value it less. To achieve their 
model’s efficient outcome in a classic multilateral Coasean Bargain, a specific bargaining 
protocol similar to their model can be implemented (with individuals interacting with 
each other one at a time, sequentially). Or one can think of the Coasean Bargain as 
between the owner and first taker; the second taker is merely providing additional context 
to their Bargain. 
The model of Bar-Gill and Persico argues the presence of more than two parties to 
a bargain does not reduce economic efficiency. Traditional bargaining literature says 
increasing the number of parties to a bargain will decrease economic efficiency because 




1974; Hoffman and Spitzer 1982). Other research though indicates increasing the number 
of parties to a bargain might not necessarily lead to inefficient, suboptimal outcomes; 
sometimes it can even improve outcomes (Bar-Gill and Persico 2016; Glaeser, Ponzetto, 
and Shleifer 2016; Gresik and Satterthwaite 1989; Shogren and Kask 1992). This is due 
to more parties to a bargaining context reducing the incentive for those who value the 
good less to acquire it from those who value it more. Since there are now additional 
parties able to take the good from takers should they acquire it the incentive to take is 
reduced. This incentive reduction is the main mechanism the Bar-Gill and Persico model 
uses to achieve efficiency, even in the absence of property rights. My experiment’s 
results are in line with the model’s conclusions. 
Validation of the Bar-Gill and Persico model of contracting and negotiating has 
important implications for the role of property rights in our society. In fact, their model is 
part of a growing school of thought arguing that liability rules can produce more efficient 
outcomes than property rights in many instances. A classic example is a car owner 
approached by a carjacker. Under traditional Coasean analysis, the solution is strong 
property rights so the owner maintains the car after the ordeal (Kaplow and Shavell 
1996). Under the Bar-Gill model with no property rights, because the owner already has 
the title for the car, a parking space, accident insurance, etc she values the car higher than 
a carjacker who has no protection from another thief car-jacking them immediately after 
they take the car. Therefore the owner is able to pay off the carjacker to not take the car 
(Bar-Gill and Persico 2016). Examples of the Bar-Gill and Persico bargaining context 
and problems leading to calls for strengthening property rights, illustrate the importance 
of testing their model. 
 
B. Previous Work 
 Much work has been done previously on Coasean Bargaining. Recent work finds 
an absence of property rights does not reduce economic efficiency (Bar-Gill and Engel 
2016). Meanwhile, the impact of incomplete information on outcomes has not been 
determined conclusively. My work contributes to the discussion about the impacts of 
incomplete information on efficiency. Furthermore, most of the previous work with more 




involving 3 separate parties is limited and my research contributes to the gap in the 
literature there as well. 
In a related economic experiment on property rights to Bar-Gill and Persico 
(2016), Bar-Gill and Engel (2016) find an absence of property rights in two-party 
bargaining does not reduce economic efficiency. They find both strong property rights 
contexts and no property rights contexts achieve statistically the same level of efficiency. 
To test the predictions of the Bar-Gill and Persico model I use the same Taker Game 
design as Bar-Gill and Engel (2016) with an experiment featuring take-it-or-leave-it 
offers between negotiators and the same interpretations and set-up for a weak property 
rights regime.  
Combining the results I report with the findings of Bar-Gill and Engel (2016) 
together imply situations where regimes without property rights can be more efficient 
than strong property rights regimes. My results indicate 3-party bargaining without 
property rights is more efficient than 2-party bargaining without property rights, and Bar-
Gill and Engel find 2-party bargaining without property rights is as efficient as 2-party 
bargaining under strong property rights (Bar-Gill and Engel 2016). The controversial 
claim that sometimes higher levels of efficiency occur under a lack of property rights 
needs future validation. 
Because other aspects of bargaining have been examined – endowment effects 
(Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990) and transaction costs (Cherry and Shogren 2005; 
Rhoads and Shogren 1999; Shogren 1993) are two popular aspects – I investigate the 
impact of completeness of information provided to participants in bargaining. Incomplete 
information is an important feature of many bargaining situations in the real world 
(Kivetz and Simonson 2000; Stigler 1961), yet previous work lacks conclusive evidence 
of its effects. Furthermore, incomplete information effects within liability rules regimes 
or contexts without property rights are even more unknown (Kaplow and Shavell 1995). 
Previous experiments do not conclusively determine the effect of incomplete 
information on bargaining outcomes. Incomplete information is found to impair 
efficiency (Croson and Johnston 2000; Farrell 1987; Mckelvey and Page 2000) and a 
tested model (Tingley and Wang 2010) suggests a decrease in efficiency will occur in my 




another instance (Kennan and Wilson 1993), there are significant concerns with the 
results because of possible differences in beliefs and biases of people from outside the 
laboratory. Meanwhile others find no effect from information reduction (Hoffman and 
Spitzer 1982). Two other experiments find conflicting results about whether there is an 
effect from information variation (Leliveld, Dijk, and Beest 2008) and a review of 
previous experiments (Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere 2002) finds efficiency depends 
on the assignment of property rights under incomplete information. Schmitt, (2004) finds 
bargaining offers proceeding under complete information are rejected more often than 
offers made under incomplete information. Further work indicates real-world 
inefficiencies resulting from incomplete information (Chatterjee and Samuelson 1983; 
Fraser 2008; Kaplow and Shavell 1995; Merton 1987; Schmitz 2006), and theoretical 
inefficiencies implying property rights should not be assigned under incomplete 
information (Schmitz 2001). Improving our understanding through experiments such as 
mine, makes models more realistic (Chatterjee and Samuelson 1983) and increases our 
ability to explain observe phenomena. Although, information incompleteness is 
suggested to impair efficiency the impact on bargaining outcomes is still in need of 
examination. Especially any interaction effects information may have with the strength of 
property rights.  
Many experiments have been run previously investigating the efficiency of two-
party Coasean Bargaining. For instance, under different property rights regimes (Bar-Gill 
and Engel 2016; Croson and Johnston 2000). However, in reality there are usually more 
than two parties to any situation involving a good and many such contexts fit the set-up 
for the Bar-Gill and Persico bargaining model. There are limitations to using two-party 
bargaining models to describe real-world contexts, and there is a need for experiments 
incorporating larger numbers of parties. 
 The literature on three-party bargaining is limited. Although there has been 
previous work about three-person bargaining, most of the work has not addressed three-
party bargaining. Much of the literature with 3 agents regards the production of public 
goods by three people (so as to create a free-riding incentive), or coalitions of two of the 
players as one of two negotiating parties (McAdams, Bouckaert, and Geest 2000). In such 




with three-party bargaining places all three parties into a multilateral negotiation at the 
same time (Hoffman and Spitzer 1983, 1982). These results also show Pareto optimal 
outcomes are possible in such situations, and usually occur. A multiple party set-up 
allows us to examine whether the results found in the public goods, coalition, and 
simultaneous bargaining games described above carry over to increases in the number of 
parties in bargaining arrangements and to sequential bargaining formats. 
Previous research on bargaining leaves gaps in our understanding about the 
efficiency implications of having 3 parties to a bargain and about the role of information 
completeness on economic outcomes. But my experiment fills the gap by showing the 
addition of a third party to bargaining does not necessarily decrease efficiency under 
weak property rights, regardless of the completeness of available information. The 
findings support Bar-Gill and Persico’s theory about the connection between strong 
property rights and efficient outcomes in bargaining. 
 
II. Model 
In Bar-Gill and Persico's general model (2016), time is discrete (t=1,2,…,T) and 
all parties discount at c < 1. Player 1 owns the good, at the beginning of period 1 (& = 1) 
and each period a different taker appears to bargain with the token owner over ownership 
of the token after that period. Each period that player   owns the token earns them a 
constant (per-period) return of 0 ≥ 0. The per-period return sequence encoding the order 
in which takers with unique valuations of the token appear is {0}	O  , and a part of the 
model. In period G + 1 the good can either lose all value, or in G the last taker arrives and 
the owner in G + 1 is the permanent owner of the good.2 The original owner of a good in 
a period is  , and the taker is d (with  < d). 
 
The Bilateral Bargaining Solution: 
Three mutually exclusive outcomes are possible in each period:  
a) Taker d takes the good and pays the damages 1̂ , = 0  
                                                 
2 Our specific experiment will focus on the instance of the last taker arriving in G and the owner in G + 1 




b) Taker d leaves owner   with the good in exchange for a “bribe”3 of '^, ≥ 0. 
c) Owner   voluntarily accepts ^, for taker d to purchase the good. 
If taker d’s value of the good held by   at the beginning of period d is represented by ê ,, 
and ^, is the price to be paid by d to   for the good, then 
 
ê , = max {0̂ + cê ,^Q	 − minh1̂ , , ^,i , '^,}                                               (1) 
 
The owner’s value, e,^ = j0 + ce,^Q	 − '^,           S ê , = '^,min=1̂ , , ^,]                &ℎ)
 ,                    (2) 
 
Equations (1) and (2) illustrate the different valuations of the good for takers and original 
owners. Takers value the good based on the value of the good to them in the present 
period plus the good’s discounted value in future periods, minus the damages or price 
paid to acquire the good. Takers will choose this value from taking or buying the good, or 
the bribe offered by the owner, whichever is greater. Owners value the good based on its 
worth in the current period plus its future discounted value, minus the bribe paid to taker 
d; if the value to the taker equals the value they offer as a bribe. If the value of the token 
to d does not equal the value of the bribe, the owner values the good at either the level of 
damages they receive for the taker taking the good, or the price the taker pays for the 
good. 
 
It is expected ^, ≥ 0 + ce,^Q	                     (3) 
 
and 0 + ce,^Q	 − '^, ≥ min =1̂ , , ^,]. The second part is clearer as: 
  
0 ≤ '^, ≤ max { 0 + ce,^Q	 − minh1̂ , , ^,i , 0}.                  (4) 
 
In other words, the price paid by taker d to owner   to take the good must be greater than 
or equal to the value the owner gets from the good plus the good’s future value. So the 
owner willingly sells. The bribe to not take the good offered by taker d to owner   is 
                                                 
3 Bar-Gill and Persico rightfully point out that while it is convenient to call '^,  a “bribe,” it really 
represents a “legally enforceable price of the right to take” the good. This is because taker d has been 
given a right to be able to take the good and   has been given a duty to give the good to d if requested. 
This discussion of “rights” and “duties” fits with the definition we have been using (Bromley 1992). We 




between zero and the value of the good to   in the present plus the good’s future value, 





 '^, = 0 if 0̂ + cê ,^Q	 − 1̂ , < 0.                    (5) 
 
Taker d will not demand a bribe if the threat to take the good is not credible, i.e. if the 




 e,OQ	 = S(0)                       (6) 
 
where S(∙) is any nondecreasing function. This allows S(∙) ≡ 0 to illustrate when G is the 
final period, and S(0) = 0/(1 − c) illustrates when the owner of the good in G 
permanently owns the good onwards. 
 
The model is unique because each period has the traditional two parties to a 
negotiation, but also a party waiting in the wings to take or buy the good or be bribed to 
not take the good the next period. This discounts the incentives to the parties in the first 
negotiation to possess the good at the end of the period because their ownership in the 
next period is jeopardized. The authors argue negotiation outcomes are more efficient 
because of the threat of losing the good in the next period to another party looking to 
possess the good. 
Bar-Gill and Persico present their model to show strong property rights are not 
necessary for efficient outcomes. Equation (1), ê , = max {0̂ + cê ,^Q	 −
minh1̂ , , ^,i , '^,}, indicates taker d maximizes the good’s value to them through their 
non-bribe option of taking the good and the bribe to not take the good. In the experiment 
the non-bribe option costs zero (1̂ ,, and ^, are both set to zero) and is worth zero. 
Therefore any value of '^, > 0 should be accepted. Takers will be indifferent between 




given taker taking the good is theoretically unlikely (given an inability to propose bribes 
less than zero, a control in the experiment). Because ^, is set to zero in the experiment a 
bargain being struck is more beneficial to all parties than exiting negotiations. If a 
bargain is not struck either the taker receives nothing for not taking the good, or the 
owner only receives damages from the taker for taking the good (again, damages are 
equal to zero in this paper’s lack of property rights context). 
 Assuming for all takers d, and two owners ℎ,  < d, with 0 > 0o, 1̂ , ≥ 1̂ ,o; the 
equilibrium quantities below are an efficient bilateral bargaining solution. Using weights 
p ∈ =0,1] to represent the owner’s bargaining power in the bribe negotiation (p = 0 
indicating the taker has all the bargaining power) we can express the bribe with: 
 
'^, = pq0̂ + cê ,^Q	r + (1 − p)q0 + ce,^Q	r − 1̂ , = 0 + ce,^Q	 − 1̂ , when p = 0 
 
'^, = j  {0}                                                                                             S q0^ + cê ,^Q	r < 1̂ ,pq0̂ + cê ,^Q	 − 1̂ ,r + (1 − p)q0 + ce,^Q	 − 1̂ ,r                        &ℎ)




 e,^ = 0 + ce,^Q	 − '^,                                                                                                        
(8) 
 
III. Experimental Design 
Bar-Gill and Engel (2016) perform a Coasean Bargaining experiment between 2 
parties in multiple stages where one subject is given the good, a token, and the other is 
not. Both parties then negotiate to keep the good, and to obtain a bribe to not take the 
good or take/destroy the good, respectively. My experiment design is similar, except after 
the first negotiation I introduce a third party in half of the negotiations to similarly 
bargain over the good with whoever possesses it after the first negotiation. 
To test the hypotheses, I compare the efficiency of results in the 3-party 
negotiations to those of the 2-party negotiations. These two form the “group-size 
treatments;” in reference to whether the subjects in a treatment are in a 3-person group 
with 2 other people, or in a 2-person group with 1 other group member. Subjects 




these group-size treatments within sessions where subjects have complete information 
about the payoffs to each other for possessing the token and within sessions where the 
payoff information is privately held. Therefore the group-size treatments involve a within 
subject design and the information treatments involve a between subject design, creating 
an overall 2x2 design for the experiment. 
Introducing anonymity in the procedures allows for an approximation of a large 
society (where not everyone knows each person they encounter enough to establish 
reputation effects) and for a mitigation of any social or moral concerns on the part of the 
participants that might increase economic efficiency (Bateson, Nettle, and Roberts 2006; 
Tennie, Frith, and Frith 2010). Anonymity therefore attenuates the results because in 
reality reputations can be established (Hoffman et al. 1994). The anonymity procedures I 
use prevent any reputation-effects actions that could occur, such as takers taking a token 
merely to “punish” an owner for not paying the requested bribe, etc. 
Equation (4) of the Bar-Gill and Persico model holds that the bribe '^, which 
taker d would accept to not take the token from  , is described by 0 ≤ '^, ≤ max { 0 +
ce,^Q	 − minh1̂ , , ^,i , 0}. In this paper’s design, 1̂ ,, and ^, are both zero. 0 for the 
original possessor ( ) is 0 and e = 30. 0̂  and cê ,^Q	 are 0. Because '^, = 0 if 0̂ +
cê ,^Q	 < 0 (Equation (5)), the design does not include '^, = 0. The design holds 
that 0 < '^, ≤ 30. In other words, a taker, d, offers the owner,  , a bribe they would 
accept in return for not taking the token. This bribe, '^,, is greater than zero, but less 
than or equal to the value of the token to the owner, e, 30 Experimental Dollars. The set-
up leads to efficient bilateral bargaining solutions where monotonic selection holds.  
 
In the complete information treatments, with 1 = 0,  = 0, e = 30, and ê = 0, 
we can compare outcomes in the 3-person negotiations and the 2-person negotiations and 
craft specific predictions for the experiment. The results do not carry over to the 
incomplete information treatments because players do not know the relative values of the 
token for the other negotiators. Therefore the final taker cannot ask for the owner’s full 
valuation of the token as a bribe. As a reminder, the taker has all the bargaining power in 





For the 3-Person Negotiations: 
In G = 2 (the second negotiation, between taker 2 and the owner from the first 
negotiation), and p = 0; we can specify Equation (7) as: 
 '^, = 0 + ce,^Q	 − 1̂ , = 30 
 
The owner,  , has the good, earns 30 from the good, and so is able to pay 30 to 
taker 2. Taker 1 earns 0 from the good and so can pay 0 to taker 2. Taker 2 would be 
indifferent between taking and walking away because they receive 0 overall if they take. 
They should accept any '^, > 0. 
 
Continuing on, in G = 1, we can specify Equation (7) as: 
 '^, = 0 + ce,^Q	 − 1̂ , = 0 
If the owner maintains possession of the good over the experiment they earn 0 (because 
they pay 30 to taker 2), so they pay 0. Taker 1 is indifferent between taking and walking 
away because they receive 0 overall if they take. They should accept any '^, > 0.  
 
For the 2-Person Negotiations: 
In G = 1 (the only, between taker 1 and the original owner), and p = 0; we can 
specify Equation (7) as: 
 '^, = 0 + ce,^Q	 − 1̂ , = 30 
 
The owner has the good, earns 30 from the good, and so is able to pay 30 to taker 
1. Taker 1 earns 0 from the good so will accept the bribe. The owner maintains 
possession of the good after successfully paying off taker 1. 
 
In both treatments the equilibrium is efficient because the taker should accept any 
'^, > 0 and leave the token with its owner. Even though 1̂ , = 0 and p = 0, we have an 
efficient equilibrium. 
 We can see a difference in the distribution of bribes between the two negotiation 
formats due to differences in where the ultimate bargaining power lays. In both cases the 




but is only the first taker in the 3-person negotiations. We should therefore see 
differences in the bribes paid to taker 1 between the two negotiation treatments. A clear 
difference of 0 versus 30. 
 
A. Hypotheses 
Traditional analysis suggests the presence of more parties to a bargain and an 
absence of strong property rights impair efficiency. Without strong property rights, 
increasing the number of “takers” leads to inefficiency because more parties decreases 
the value of bargaining (Kerr 2007). The Bar-Gill and Persico model (2016) argues this is 
incorrect and increasing the number of takers also leads to an efficient equilibrium 
(measured by the summation of value to all the parties in the game). I predict increasing 
the number of parties in a sequential bargaining set-up from 2 to 3 will not decrease 
efficiency, the same hypothesis as Bar-Gill and Persico (2016), and that we will be able 
to reject Hypothesis 1. Additionally, their model indicates strong property rights in 
general are not necessary for economic efficiency. Therefore, a further hypothesis tested 
is whether economic efficiency occurs in a context of no property rights. Traditional 
analysis predicts efficiency will be impaired by the absence of strong property rights. 
Although Bar-Gill and Persico (2016) do not predict reduced efficiency from a lack of 
property rights, results from Bar-Gill and Engel (2016) show that under both regimes of 
strong and absent property rights, people playing similar games as this one fail to achieve 
100 percent economic efficiency. Therefore I anticipate rejecting Hypothesis 1a, of 
achieving the theoretical result of 100 percent efficiency in the experiment. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The measure of economic efficiency, retained 
ownership of the token by the original owner4, will not be 
statistically significantly different in the 3-person negotiation 
context treatments than in the 2-person negotiation context 
treatments. 
                                                 
4 Due to the absence of property rights in our example there are more accurate legal terms to call the 
“owner” than an owner (Lehman and Phelps 2005). However we will continue to use “owner” for 




Hypothesis 1a: There will be no statistically significant 
difference between the theoretical economic efficiency and the 
efficiency the experiment identifies.  
 
Bar-Gill and Persico (2016) are unclear about whether there are differing effects 
of transaction costs and asymmetric information for stronger and weaker property rights 
regimes. Regarding the presence of complete or incomplete information, I predict the 
presence of incomplete information will reduce efficiency the based on the most relevant 
previous research on the subject (Feder and Feeny 1991; Tingley and Wang 2010). Feder 
and Feeny (1991) also argue bargains with incomplete information combined with weak 
property rights will be even more economically inefficient than the sum of either effect 
alone. The theory that the presence of incomplete information will reduce efficiency is 
consistent with traditional Coasean analysis (Hoffman and Spitzer 1982). 
 
Hypothesis 2: The measure of economic efficiency, the 
percentage of retained ownership of the token by the original 
owner, will not be statistically significantly reduced by the 
presence of incomplete information about the value of the 
token to the other parties of the negotiation. 
 
Entering the parameters of the experiment allows us to utilize Equation 
(7) to predict the bribes paid to the takers in the two different negotiation 
treatments, under complete information. The model predicts taker 1 will receive 
30 when they are only 2 parties to a negotiation, but will receive 0 when there 
are 3 parties to the negotiation. The decrease in the size of the bribe reflects 
Bar-Gill and Persico’s argument multiple takers provide a disincentive to take. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Bribe proposals from the first taker will not be 
significantly different between the 2-person negotiation context 
treatments and the 3-person negotiation context treatments, 





IV. Data and Experiment Procedure 
A total of 120 undergraduate and graduate students were recruited at a public 
university in the northeastern United States in the Fall of 2017 and paid based on their 
performance in the experiment. The experience with other economic experiments, time to 
complete the comprehension questions, Cognitive Reflection Test scores (Frederick 
2005), gender ratios, and areas of study of the experiment participants were similar 
between treatments. Participants received a show-up fee of $5 and the average total 
payout at the end of the experiment was $23.22. The payout was based on each 
experimental dollar earned by a person in the experiment being worth 5 cents of a U.S. 
dollar. Z-tree (Fischbacher 2007), the same economic experiment software used by Bar-
Gill and Engel (2016), was used to run the experiment. I used previous experiments (Bar-
Gill and Engel, (2016)) as a guide to determine the sample size needed in this 
experiment. A power analysis was not completed prior to running the experiment to 
determine the sample size for between subject and within subject samples. 
Participants play two cycles each experiment session: one cycle for each group-
size treatment. A cycle is one set of rounds of the same group-size treatment. A round is a 
set of negotiations over a token, the owner at the end of a round is paid based on the 
value of the token to them. There are 3 rounds in a cycle and so each subject was party to 
three different rounds in each configuration of group size for a total of six rounds in the 
entire session. In other words, in each cycle a participant was placed in three different 
groups (a different group each round), and bargained in that group with 1 or 2 other 
anonymous participants. The number of other group members depended on whether the 
subject was in the 2-person group cycle or the 3-person group cycle. 
Half of the 10 experimental sessions were conducted with people having full 
information of how much the token was worth to them and their partner(s). The 
remaining 5 sessions were conducted with people having no information of how much 
the token was worth to their partner(s). In those remaining sessions they were told how 
much it was worth to themselves in that round. Each session had 12 participants. 
At the start of each round of the experiment, subjects are randomly assigned a role 




Experimental Dollars to them. Subject B and C are “takers” of the token which is worth 0 
Experimental Dollars to them. These values are based on those in Bar-Gill and Engel 
(2016) and fit the necessary conditions of the Bar-Gill and Persico (2016) model. During 
B and C’s negotiations with the owner of the token, B and C can take the token away 
from the owner without incurring any damages and without paying any price for the 
token. Therefore in the experiment the values of ^, and 1̂ ,  are both zero. Because 
^, and 1̂ ,  are both zero, B and C do not have a duty to respect the property right of A 
(or B). Based on the definition of “property right” we are using (Bromley 1992), the lack 
of any duty creates the absence of property rights in the setting. The value of the token is 
constant throughout the entire round for the subject, and is the same for all participants of 
the same role throughout all sessions. 
The exact sequence of the experiment sessions is as follows. First, participants 
answer 3 simple demographic questions (gender, academic major, and previous 
experience with economic experiments). Next participants are given instructions about 
the bargaining game. The experimenter reads the instructions aloud to the participants, 
who are required to correctly answer 3 comprehension questions to confirm their 
understanding of the game. Copies of the instructions are in the Appendix. After being 
told which role had been randomly assigned to them for the round, subjects then began 
the first negotiation. To control for potential learning effects, the order subjects played 
the treatments of the experiment was set to 2-person then 3-person for half of the 
sessions, and 3-person then 2-person for the other half of sessions. 
Each round of the experiment begins with taker B deciding on a proposal to offer 
owner A for B to not take the token. Proposals are between 0 and 60 Experimental 
Dollars. Then A decides whether to accept the proposal or not. After A enters their 
decision B is told of A’s decision. If A accepted B’s proposal, B receives that many 
Experimental Dollars while A loses that many but maintains possession of the token. If A 
rejected B’s proposal B then has the option of taking the token from A. They then choose 
to take the token or not. This concludes a 2-person treatment round. The 3-person 
treatment rounds continue with C making an offer to the owner of the token after the first 
negotiation (either A or B) as B had done. The process of the 2-person treatment thus 




either A or B (whoever owns the token after the first negotiation). Figure 2.1a illustrates 
the process for a round of the 3-person treatment (Figure 2.1b illustrates the process for 
the 2-person treatment). 
Each repetition of the Steps constitutes a round. After each round the subject is 
randomly and anonymously paired with another participant(s) in the experiment. After 3 
rounds of their first cycle the subjects begin a second cycle (either the 3-person treatment 
cycle or the 2-person treatment cycle, the opposite of whichever cycle they have just 
completed). After finishing the second cycle the players have completed the game. They 
perform a Cognitive Reflection Test, answer a survey on their experience, are paid based 
on their performance in the experiment, and exit the simulation laboratory. 
Conducting treatments where people are in 2-person negotiating groups and 
people are in 3-person negotiating groups allow us to see whether additional group 
members decrease efficiency. Varying whether people know how much the token is 




A. Adding a Party Increases Retained Ownership 
Introducing a second taker significantly increases efficiency. The result is robust 
to information effects. Incomplete information does not have a significant effect overall, 
but affects 2-person groups. Efficiency is measured as the proportion of original owners 
who maintain possession of the good (the token) after the first negotiation. Only the 
results from the first bargaining negotiations are reported because there are two 
opportunities to take the token in the 3-person treatment (either negotiations with B or C 
could result in it being taken). The Appendix reports analysis using ownership at the end 
of the entire round as the measure of efficiency and finds similar results to the analysis 
below (Appendix Table A2.1 and Figures A2.1-A2.3). However in the appendiceal 
analysis the efficiency gains from adding a second taker are attenuated, though still 
significant, for 2 models. A third model only looking at a subset of the population who 




This group probably realized the mechanism of the Bar-Gill and Persico model was 
absent for the second taker and so the impact of the mechanism disappeared. 
The proportion of original owners who maintain possession after the first 
bargaining negotiation in the 2-person treatments is 62.22 percent and the proportion 
within the 3-person treatment is 85.92 percent (Figure 2.2). The difference is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level This result rejects the first hypothesis, Hypothesis 1, of 
retained token ownership by the original owner not being significantly different in 3-
person groups than in 2-person groups. The rates of retained ownership for original 
possessors are statistically significantly different from the theoretical 100 percent rate. I 
therefore reject Hypothesis 1a that the difference between the theoretical economic 
efficiency and the efficiency the experiment finds will not be statistically significant. 
Knowledge about how much your negotiating partner values the token is overall 
not found to have a significant impact on efficiency. In complete information treatments 
76.67 percent of original owners maintain possession after the first negotiation, while 
70.98 percent maintain possession in the incomplete information treatments (Figure 2.3). 
The difference is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Weak statistical 
significance for a difference of this magnitude is not surprising as the number of 
observations in the experiment was chosen to detect proportional differences larger than 
0.2. Additionally, the difference between treatments is driven by 2-person groups, not by 
all group size treatments (Figure 2.4). The second hypothesis, Hypothesis 2, that 
incomplete information would not affect efficiency to a statistically significant degree is 
therefore unable to be rejected for the whole sample, and an effect is only found in 2-
person groups. 
I break down the results above to identify any possible interaction effects between 
information completeness and the number of takers. 
As in Figure 2.2, a clear effect from the size of the group is seen in Figure 2.4 
when looking at the rate of maintained possession after just the first negotiation (the only 
negotiation for the 2-person group treatment, the first of two negotiations for the 3-person 
group treatment). 66.67 percent of owners maintain possession of the token after the first 
negotiation in the 2-person, complete treatment; 57.78 percent in the 2-person, 




treatment; and 85.12 percent in the 3-person, incomplete information treatment. The 
addition of a second taker “waiting in the wings” significantly improves economic 
efficiency. The impact is statistically significant for both information treatments. Again 
however, Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests confirm the rates of ownership for original 
possessors in all combinations of treatments are statistically significantly different from 
the theoretically possible level. I am able to reject Hypothesis 1a, of no significant 
difference between observed ownership retention and 100 percent of original owners 
retaining possession, for all group size and information combinations. 
Economic efficiency is significantly increased in the 3-person treatment compared 
to the 2-person treatment with regards to information effects as well. Although having 
incomplete information about the value of the token to your partner significantly 
decreases economic efficiency within the 2-person treatment, it does not statistically 
significantly affect efficiency within the 3-person treatment. The addition of a second 
taker mitigates negative impacts from incomplete information. 
Equation (9) presents the preferred regression for analyzing the efficiency of just 
the first negotiation. The dependent variable is the state of ownership after the first 
negotiation of bargaining. The explanatory variables are a dummy variable for if the 
subject is in the 3-person group size treatment, and a dummy variable for whether the 
subject is in an incomplete information context. Additional s control variables in the 
regression are a variable indicating the proposal offered by player B to A and a dummy 
variable for if that proposal is higher than the value of the token to the original owner (30 
Experimental Dollars), the round the negotiation takes place in, the cycle of the 
experiment the negotiation takes place in, the number of economic experiments the 
subject has participated in previously, the person’s gender, and their major. A Max Time 
to Comprehension control variable is included to represent the amount of time required to 
answer the comprehension questions by the negotiation member who required the most 
time to complete them. This variable controls for the impacts of an individual group 
member not understanding the game concepts as well as their peers. 
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Table 2.1 reports coefficients from three models along the lines of Equation (9). Columns 
(1), (2), and (3) report regressions of ownership of the token after just the first 
negotiation. Column (1) only includes the group size and information treatments as a 
covariate while Column (2) reports the regression results from Equation (9). Column (3) 
reports the results from Equation (9), but also includes a control covariate regarding the 
proportion of CRT questions the subject answered correctly. The CRT proportion is a 
measure of how well participants can employ a slower and more reflective decision-
making process rather than one using little conscious deliberation (Frederick 2005). 
Regression analysis confirms the presence of an additional party improves 
economic efficiency and incomplete information decreases it. The major factors 
impacting whether an original token owner maintains possession over their token are 
whether they are in a 3-person treatment (which significantly improves the resulting 
economic efficiency), the information treatment (incomplete information reduces 
efficiency), the proposals of the first taker (both whether that proposal is higher than the 
value of the token, and the size of the proposal as a continuous variable), and the round of 
the cycle the negotiation is in. The maximum time between the negotiators to answer the 
comprehension questions correctly impacts levels of efficient ownership in only the full 
model, while the CRT specification removes the effect. The CRT specification selects for 
individuals who understand concepts quickly, therefore no longer seeing an impact from 
understanding of the game is not surprising. Demographic variables of gender, major, and 
experiment experience are not significant. 
Analyses do not indicate any session-length learning effects impacting efficiency 
as people progress through their experiment session. Appendix Table A2.3 reports the 
results of the preferred regression using only data from the first cycle people played and 
gives similar results to those reported above. However many of the coefficients on 
variables are smaller in magnitude and many covariates are no longer statistically 
significant (such as the coefficient on Incomplete Information). 
 
B. Proposals Fall within the Predicted Range, but Drivers of Variation are Unclear 
 Proposals generally fall within the range predicted by the model and the 




imply observed bribe proposals should be within a range of  0 < '^, ≤ 30 when 
information is complete. The mean and median of proposals do fall within the model’s 
predicted range,  0 < '^, ≤ 30. In the experiment takers are able to submit a bribe 
proposal between 0 and 60 Experimental Dollars. Over the experiment sessions, people 
submit a median proposal of 25 and a mean proposal of 28.61 Experimental Dollars 
(Table 2.2). Histograms of the proposals visualize the frequency of players proposing 
bribes within the predicted range (Appendix Figure A2.9). The histograms also identify 
the impacts to proposals from the presence of incomplete information. Proposals fit the 
predicted range under complete information, but fit the range less well when you do not 
know how much the token is worth to your partner. Summary statistics indicate the 
majority of proposals fit the predicted bribe range of the Bar-Gill and Persico model, 
throughout negotiations; but do not fit the specific Experimental Dollars amounts they 
predict. 
 Equation (10) examines which covariates impact how much the taker proposes to 
not take the token. Proposal is a variable for how many Experimental Dollars the taker 
asks from the token owner in exchange for not taking the token. GroupSize is a dummy 
variable for if the person is in a 3-person group, Information is again a dummy variable 
for whether a person is within an incomplete information session of the experiment. s 
covariates are included in Equation (10) to control for other factors that may affect 
proposal amounts. Of them Round and Cycle again locate the negotiation within the 
session; Comprehension indicates how long it took the person to complete the 
comprehension questions. Also included are the collected demographic variables of 
Gender, Major, and Experience. Comprehension is included to account for heterogeneous 
understanding of the game. Table 2.3 Column (1) reports a regression of Equation (10). 
The regression for Column (2) also includes the person’s CRT score as a measure of their 
response to decision making environments. 
 F),!" =  + 	v)0 w +  _x*S)'!& * + y…aT,y…a + b            (10)  
 
The two models in Table 2.3 agree that neither information nor group size 
treatment effects on ownership worked through a mechanism of statistically significantly 




proposals by lowering the bribes proposed by the first taker (since their future ownership 
of the token is jeopardized in 3-person treatments, but not in 2-person treatments), but no 
such effect is found. The amount proposed is affected by the covariates indicating a 
student majoring in biology and the CRT score, both of which significantly decrease the 
amount proposed. Both models shown in Table 2.3 have similar significant effects from 
the biology major covariate. Incorporating subject fixed effects (Table A2.6) to the CRT 
model nullifies any effect from group size on bribes proposals.  
None of the information we collect except the biology major conclusively drive proposal 
behavior, but the majority of proposals fall in the range predicted by the Bar-Gill and 
Persico model. Equation (4) of the Bar-Gill and Persico model holds that the bribe '^, 
that taker d would accept to not take the token from  , is described by 0 ≤ '^, ≤
max { 0 + ce,^Q	 − minh1̂ , , ^,i , 0}. The design of the experiments means 0 < '^, ≤
30. 29.57 percent of proposals are outside of the predicted range (85 exceed 30 
Experimental Dollars and 4 are zero). A driver of the violation of the predicted proposal 
behavior is incomplete information. In the incomplete information treatments 37.09 
percent of proposals are outside the range. In the complete information treatments only 
22.00 percent of proposals are greater than the owner’s valuation of the token (no 
proposals are zero in that context). Proposal statistics from incomplete information 
treatments are consistently larger than those from complete information treatments (Table 
2.2). 
We also find proposals outside of the model’s predicted range when just 
examining the last proposals subjects offer, so within session learning does not appear to 
be significant. It is not conclusive whether proposals offers are significantly impacted by 
the group size treatment; however the variance of proposals appears to be impacted by 
incomplete information (Appendix Figure A2.9). 
Supplementary work in the Appendix further examines proposal behavior. A 
similar analysis to that above looking at the offering of a proposal to not take the token 
higher than the token is worth to the original owner identifies no clear driving covariates 
except a player’s previous experience with economic experiments(Appendix Table A2.4 
and Appendix Figures A2.6-A2.8). And the effect there is only 0.434, an economically 




inexperience with economic experiments our players possessed. Analyses in the 
Appendix report the results of the preferred regression using only data from the first cycle 
the participants played (Appendix Table A2.2). Incomplete information explains 
observed proposal behavior for the CRT model indicating takers who finish the CRT test 
in time offer significantly lower bribes in cycle 1. The biology major impact is 
comparable. Since the impact from CRT score is not present in the first cycle, this 
implies learning effects as this population plays the game.  
Proposal analysis does not find information or the number of takers to be 
conclusive drivers of behavior for the entire population of players. It does find most bribe 
proposals offered by B to A fall within the model’s predicted range, and incomplete 
information lowers bribe proposals at the beginning for a subset of players.  
In addition to no effect found in the regressions, there is not a difference between the 
bribe proposals first takers submit in the 2-person negotiations and the 3-person 
negotiations, under complete information (Table 2.4). Hypothesis 3 of bribe proposals 
from the first taker not being significantly different between the complete information 2-
person negotiations and the complete information 3-person negotiations is unable to 
rejected. The Bar-Gill and Persico model predicts first takers in 2-person bargains will 
request 30 Experimental Dollars, and 0 Experimental Dollars in 3-person bargains. The 
experimental results do not fit the predictions. 
Analysis supports the Bar-Gill and Persico model. Introducing a second taker 
actually significantly increases efficiency. Knowing a second taker will negotiate with 
whoever possesses the good after the first negotiation encourages efficient bargains to be 
struck. Incomplete information does affect efficiency, but the outcomes of 3-party 
negotiations are robust to any information effects. The offers of takers in the first 
negotiation are not significantly correlated with the number of group members 
negotiating or if people know how much the token is worth to their partner. The 
efficiency findings follow Bar-Gill and Persico’s model and challenge the importance of 






 The model of Bar-Gill and Persico (2016) challenged traditional Coasean 
analysis’ arguments about the importance of limited parties to bargaining and the 
necessity of strong property rights. However, its conclusions needed to be validated. I 
find the Bar-Gill and Persico model and context allows for exchange efficiency to 
improve through the addition of a second person trying to take a good from its original 
owner. The result is robust to the presence of incomplete information. Overall incomplete 
information about how much the token is worth to your partner only has a statistically 
significant impact on bargaining efficiency in 2-person bargaining. Significant 
improvements in efficiency from adding parties to bargains challenges traditional 
analysis and suggests policies besides strong property rights can address many real-world 
issues. 
Although incomplete information has some impact on efficiency in 2-person 
bargaining, there is no effect in 3-person bargaining. Hypothesis 2, that there would not 
be a statistically significant reduction in efficiency resulting from the presence of 
incomplete information, is able to be rejected. The fact that this ability to reject is driven 
by data from the 2-person treatments indicates another benefit of adding an additional 
party to bargaining: the mitigation of any incomplete information effects.  
The analysis shows lower economic efficiency (measured by the sum of 
Experimental Dollars received by the group, that sum being maximized with the original 
owner maintaining possession of the token after negotiating) compared with what is 
theoretically possible. The efficiency loss is 14.08 percent in the 3-person, treatment. 
Hypothesis 1a, that there would be no difference between the identified economic 
efficiency and the theoretical economic efficiency of 100 percent, is rejected. Though 
efficiency losses are theoretically unlikely – because it is not rational for takers to take a 
token that is worth nothing to them – such losses were expected based on the laboratory 
results of Bar-Gill and Engel (2016). They find that even with strong property rights, 
economic efficiency is not achieved 100 percent of the time. In fact the efficiency losses 
reported in Bar-Gill and Engel (2016) are similar to what is reported here. Our results 
also allow me to reject Schmitt's (2004) idea of proposals under complete information 




More importantly, the hypothesis, Hypothesis 1, that the addition of a second 
taker would not significantly impact efficiency (compared to a one taker context) is 
rejected. Compared with 3-person losses of 14.08 percent, economic efficiency losses in 
the 2-person treatment are 37.78 percent. The results indicate the addition of a third party 
to bargaining significantly improves economic efficiency, by 38.09 percent (from 62.22 
percent efficiency to 85.92 percent).  
Analysis of proposals made by token takers to token owners suggests an effect on 
the variance of proposals from incomplete information, but whether there is an effect 
from the size of the group in which people are negotiating is inconclusive. The 
information impact is intuitive as less information about the value of the token to your 
negotiating partner would lead you to offer a wider variance in proposals. The Bar-Gill 
and Persico model predicts there will be a difference in the bribes first takers request 
between the group size treatments, under complete information. There is no pattern in the 
data supporting such a claim. Hypothesis 3 of bribe proposals from the first taker not 
being significantly different between the 2-person negotiation treatments and the 3-
person negotiation treatments, under complete information, is unable to be rejected. 
My results provide support for the hypothesis of the Bar-Gill and Persico model 
that strong property rights are not necessary for exchange efficiency to occur. Contrary to 
harming the efficiency of bargaining, the presence of additional sequential takers (and 
negotiations) improves efficiency in the absence of property rights. However, the 
addition of a second taker is not enough to eliminate the entire loss of efficiency 
experienced by the 2-person groups. Bar-Gill and Engel (2016) find a loss of economic 
efficiency in their experiments even in the presence of strong property rights. Therefore 
my overall loss of efficiency does not indicate a loss necessarily resulting from an 
absence of property rights. Our findings support the results of the Bar-Gill and Persico 
model and are in line with Bar-Gill and Engel (2016). 
Support for the Bar-Gill and Persico model combined with the results from Bar-
Gill and Engel (2016) imply economic efficiency could be higher in the absence of 
property rights than under strong property rights. Bar-Gill and Engel find bargaining 
efficiency is similar between Coasean Bargains negotiated under strong property rights 




finding strong property rights and no property rights perform almost identically with 1 
owner and 1 taker and my results finding efficiency is actually higher with 2 takers and 
no property rights together imply bargaining contexts with 2 takers and no property rights 
have higher levels of efficiency than strong property rights contexts with 1 taker. The 
results point to certain bargaining contexts where efficiency is higher without property 
rights than under strong property rights. However research is needed to confirm 
efficiency gains from additional parties under no property rights are larger than such 
gains under strong property rights regimes. 
The results I report are the lower bound of efficiency gains from the Bar-Gill and 
Persico mechanism and simple institutional design changes promise improvement. The 
design makes it more difficult for owners to maintain possession of the token due to a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer structure with takers making the proposals. It is possible that 
economic efficiency would further improve in the absence of property rights by 
instituting an ability for original owners to recover their assets through repeated 
bargaining with takers (rather than the current “take-it-or-leave-it” offering system in 
place in this experiment), by including more than 3 parties in the bargaining, or by 
alternative framings of the negotiations. Such institutional changes in bargaining are put 
forth by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983). Having owners propose bribes rather than 
takers might also improve efficiency (Bar-Gill and Persico 2016). Finally, the Bar-Gill 
and Persico model focuses generally on per-period token payoffs while our experiment 
only has payoffs at the end of the entire bargaining process. Considering the intuitive 
logic of the Bar-Gill and Persico model these structural adjustments are possibly the 
necessary ingredients to achieve total economic efficiency in the experiment’s context 
even with the absence of property rights. 
Additional research is needed to confirm the outcome found is directly from the 
Bar-Gill and Persico mechanism. The design of the experiment technically eliminates the 
benefits of the second taker mechanism by having the token worth 0 to the first taker. The 
presence of a second taker causes no motivation for the first taker to not take because the 
first taker loses nothing from the second taker taking the token from them. The first 
taker’s future valuation of the token is already zero so discounting the future valuation 




presence of a second taker discourages the first taker from taking the token. There are 
therefore two possible explanations for increased efficiency from adding an additional 
party to bargaining: the logic of the Bar-Gill and Persico mechanism and unknown 
behavioral reasons. We need another experiment where the token has value to the first 
taker. However, even if behavioral reasons explain the outcomes, the presence of a 
second taker does improve the measure of efficiency so if the Bar-Gill and Persico 
model’s specific mechanism does not identify the driver of increased efficiency, the 
model’s predictions still occur for other reasons. 
Though “property rights establish the very principle of a market” (Spruyt 1996) is 
the mantra of many, lack of protection for them seen as an economic hindrance (Murphy, 
Shleifer, and Vishny 1993; Rapaczynski 1996), and calls increasing for their inclusion in 
the solutions to many pressing environmental issues (Feder and Feeny 1991; Macinko 
and Bromley 2003; Macinko and Raymond 2001) the possibility of economic efficiency 
occurring without them remains a tantalizing prospect. Real-world examples like fishing 
grounds and public lands grazing areas show the difficulty of ascribing property rights in 
many environmental contexts (Alston and Mueller 2008; Anderson and Hill 1975; Smith 
2012). Being able to achieve economic efficiency without requiring the establishment of 
effective and strong property rights would save much time and effort and provide a more 
hopeful view of many complex, seemingly intractable issues. The model of Bar-Gill and 
Persico suggests liability rules are superior to property rights in many instances. Other 
work regarding the benefits of liability rules regimes and future directions for my 
research promise to make experiments using liability rules an exciting field and this 
experiment just a first step in it. Alternatives to strong property rights regimes – such as 
liability rules based regimes, or greater use of contracting – might be more useful than 
previously thought and deserve more consideration (Ayres and Talley 1995; Bar-Gill and 
Engel 2016; Bar-Gill and Persico 2016; Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer 2016; Kaplow 
and Shavell 1996, 1995; Schmitz 2001).  
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First Negotiation Ownership 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
 
3-Person Treatment 1.298*** 1.242*** 1.058*** 
 (0.188) (0.274) (0.322) 
Incomplete Information -0.293* -0.483** -0.606* 
 (0.177) (0.234) (0.314) 
3-Person Treatment - 0.236 0.702 
     X Incomplete Information  (0.385) (0.523) 
Proposal - -0.061*** -0.074*** 
 
 (0.012) (0.016) 
High Proposal - 1.407*** 1.562*** 
 
 (0.380) (0.497) 
Round - 0.219** 0.250* 
 
 (0.112) (0.144) 
Cycle - -0.099 -0.050 
  (0.190) (1.036) 
Experience - -0.102** 0.061 
 
 (0.051) (0.164) 
Max Time to Comprehension - -0.001** -0.001 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Gender (1=Female) - 0.029 0.050 
  (0.188) (0.250) 
UG Major: Biology - 0.258 0.224 
  (0.239) (0.327) 
UG Major: ENRE - 0.072 0.463 
  (0.328) (0.454) 
Proportion CRT Correct - - -0.728 
   (1.036) 
Constant 0.652*** 1.619*** 1.725*** 
 (0.142) (0.479) (0.627) 
Observations 708 708 441 
AIC 763.45 736.24 452.44 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Logit regression. Clustered standard errors by the subject, cycle, and 
session are in parentheses. The unit of observation is at the subject level by session and cycle, and is 
considered repeated for all observations within a session and cycle. Column (1) gives the regression of 




treatments. Column (2) reports the results of a regression based on Equation 7. Column (3) reports the 
preferred model of a regression with a dummy variable for whether the original owner of the token maintains 
ownership of the token after the first negotiation as the dependent variable and controlling for CRT score. 
Subjects who do not complete the CRT within 90 seconds are removed from the sample in Column (3).The 
3-Person Treatment covariate is a dummy variable for if the subject is in the 3-subject sized group treatment. 
The Incomplete Information covariate is a dummy variable for if the subject is in the incomplete information 
treatment. Proposal indicates the bribe proposal offered by player B to A, and High Proposal is a dummy 
variable for if that proposal is higher than the value of the token to the original owner. Experience, Gender, 
and UG Major control for demographic factors such as how many previous economic experiments the player 
has participated in, their gender, and their undergraduate major (Biology and Environmental and Natural 
Resource Economics are controlled for because of concerns the programs’ curricula would bias participants 
of those majors.). Round and Cycle indicate the round of a cycle and the cycle of the session in which the 
proposal took place. Max Time to Comprehension indicates the longest time for a subject to correctly answer 
the comprehension questions between the owner of the token and the taker of the token. Proportion CRT 






Table 2.2: Bribes Proposed in Negotiations (Experimental Dollars) 
 1
st
 Quartile Median Mean 3
rd
 Quartile 
First Negotiation 18.00 25.00 28.61 35.00 
     Complete Information 15.00 25.00 27.48 30.00 
     Incomplete Information 20.00 30.00 29.78 40.00 












3-Person Treatment 3.758 0.086 
 
(3.008) (3.305) 
Incomplete Information 2.043 -1.643 
 
(2.824) (3.691) 
3-Person Treatment -2.806 -0.219 
     X Incomplete Information (4.240) (5.155) 
Round 0.834 2.058 
 
(1.071) (1.282) 
Cycle -0.136 1.377 
 
(2.106) (2.634) 
Comprehension 0.011* 0.010 
 
(0.007) (0.009) 
Gender (1=Female) 1.502 2.594 
 
(2.153) (2.894) 
UG Major: Biology -5.992** -6.544** 
 
(2.532) (3.141) 
UG Major: ENRE 5.202 -1.378 
 
(4.775) (4.827) 
Experience -0.845* 2.050 
 (0.474) (1.998) 
Proportion CRT Correct - -20.858** 
  
(10.624) 
Constant 124.352*** 20.293*** 
 
(4.664) (6.229) 
Observations 267 153 
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.025 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Fixed effects regressions reported. Robust clustered standard errors by 
the subject, cycle, and session are in parentheses. The unit of observation is at the subject level by session 
and cycle, and is considered repeated for all observations within a session and cycle. Reports a regression 
with the proposal made in the first negotiation as the dependent variable. Column (1) is a model including 
all subjects, while Column (2) reports results only using subjects who finished the CRT in time. The 
regression is described in Equation (10). 3-Person Group Treatment is a dummy variable for whether the 
subjects are in a cycle where they had 2 other members in their group. Incomplete Information is a dummy 




Cycle indicate the round of the cycle and the cycle of the session in which the proposal took place. 
Comprehension indicates how long it took the subjects to complete the game comprehension questions at 
the beginning of the experiment. UG major: indicates the participant’s area of study with “Other” as the 
base. Experience indicates how many previous economic experiments the subject had participated in 






Table 2.4: Bribes Proposed in Complete Information Negotiations (Experimental Dollars) 
 1
st
 Quartile Median Mean 3
rd
 Quartile 
First Negotiation 15.00 25.00 27.48 30.00 
     2-Person 15.00 22.50 26.41 30.00 
     3-Person 15.75 25.00 28.55 35.00 










• A is assigned the tokenStep 1:
• B makes an offer to AStep 2:
• A chooses to accept or reject B's offer
Step 3:
• The owner chooses to accept or reject C's offer
Step 4:
• If the owner rejects C's offer, then C chooses 
whether to take the token
Stage 5:
• If A rejects the offer, then B chooses whether to 
take the token
Step 5:
• C makes an offer to the owner of the token from 
Stage 3
• A is assigned the tokenStage 1:
• B makes an offer to AStage 2:
• A chooses to accept or reject B's offer
Stage 3:
• If A rejects the offer, then B chooses 





Figure 2.2. The proportion of original owners of the token 





Figure 2.3. The proportion of original token owners maintaining 






Figure 2.4. The proportion of original owners maintaining 
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Common Pool Resource (CPR) self-management programs such as Territorial Use Rights 
in Fisheries are a popular tool to combat overharvesting. I report an economic experiment 
analyzing such management programs in neighboring CPRs. Unlike previous work, I 
specifically test how individual management areas affect each other. In the experiment 
participants are either in solitary management areas with 5 other people or in an area of 3 
people and able to illegally harvest from another area with 3 people. Participants are also 
either managed from outside the CPR or they democratically self-manage their area. Self-
managing groups report higher incomes, increased sustainability, and more regulation 
enforcement and compliance. However, poaching between connected areas decreases 
incomes, sustainability, and resource protection for all. Overall, self-managing users earn 
23% more than users managed by an outside authority, while users in connected areas 
earn 37% less than in solitary areas. The poaching externalities imposed by dividing CPR 
users into separate groups may eliminate the benefits of small groups of users self-
managing their resources. Resource managers need to consider inter-group dynamics 
(such as the impacts dividing users can have on poaching levels, incomes, and resource 
sustainability) before implementing small-scale management programs.  
Introduction 
Concerns about overharvesting and resource collapse, low incomes of resource 
harvesters, and compliance with resource management rules are leading governments 
around the globe to consider resource self-management proposals like Territorial Use 
Rights for Fisheries (TURF) programs (Afflerbach et al., 2014; “Sustainable fisheries,” 
2013; “Territorial Use Rights for Fishing (TURF) Programs,” 2013). TURFs put 
stakeholders of a fishery in charge of fishing areas to manage either independently or 
with some level of oversight by a government authority. Frequently a TURF program 
divides a fishery into discrete spatial areas called “TURFs.” The recent popularity of 
TURFs and other forms of CPR self-management is because many papers argue small-
scale self-management groups can prevent resource collapse and empower local 




Though many resource management reforms involve dividing a resource into 
smaller parts (Cass and Edney, 1978; Taylor, 2003), little work considers how the 
resulting management groups and their users impact others. Previous research examines 
how individual CPR self-management groups behave, and compares outcomes in single, 
solitary government managed resources to outcomes in single, solitary self-managing 
resources. But if a management program localizes management by dividing a larger 
resource into smaller parts, in order to bring resource management to a more local level, 
it necessarily will create multiple resource management groups. Therefore whether these 
groups harm or help neighboring groups is critical. A large body of experimental research 
examining competition between groups in other contexts reports a “minimal group 
paradigm.” The paradigm suggests suboptimal outcomes occur because groups form out-
group biases and exhibit destructive behavior towards other groups, even when group 
assignment is seemingly random or based on trivial things (Chen and Li, 2009; Diehl, 
1990; Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2009; Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel and Turner, 2001). 
Kranton et al. (2018) refer to the related in-group bias as “groupiness.” Dividing fishers 
into groups may initiate groupiness and minimal group paradigm behavior. Not 
investigating how self-managing groups affect each other means well-intentioned 
resource management proposals might hurt the very resources and communities they 
mean to help. 
I design a common pool resource economic experiment allowing us to determine 
the effort resource users will expend to protect their resource, and whether delegating 
authority over a resource to users improves profits and sustainability. In this experiment 
participants are either in solitary groups of 6 users, or in groups of 3 users connected to 
another group of 3 users. Players are either under a harvest management regime set by an 
outside management authority, or they collectively design the management regime they 
harvest under. The experiment compares the potential outcomes of an extractor managed 
resource like a TURF to a classic government managed one. Unlike previous work 
though it takes into account how individual management groups affect each other. 
Utilizing a treatment with user groups able to extract from each other’s management 
areas I examine inter-group dynamics to compare performance between larger and 




I find dividing a resource into smaller parts leads to suboptimal outcomes while 
self-managing improves outcomes. Despite comparable “rules of the game” overall, 
players change their behavior after a resource is split into smaller sub-management areas 
statistically significantly decreasing user incomes, resource sustainability, and increasing 
violations of resource management regulations. Members of smaller connected 
management areas extract 20% more overall and have incomes 37% lower than members 
of larger solitary management areas. Self-managing statistically significantly increases 
incomes, improves resource sustainability, and increases stewardship and resource 
protection. The average income of self-managing users is 23% higher than outside 
managed users and they extract 12% less. The results indicate decision-makers must be 
careful and consider group competition dynamics when designing and implementing 
resource management reforms. 
Motivation 
A particularly salient example of the dynamic described where common pool 
resources are divided into smaller management areas is Territorial Use Rights for 
Fisheries proposals (TURF). TURFs have recently become popular in fishery economics 
to address the fisheries crisis (Poon and Bonzon, 2013). In his seminal book on the 
subject, Christy explains TURF programs as giving rights to a fishery to a local 
community, a community group, a co-operative of fishermen, a corporation, an 
individual, etc. (Christy, 1982). Such rights include the right of exclusion, the right of 
setting the harvest level, etc. Exclusion allows rents to be generated by blocking new 
entrants to the fishery (who would dissipate rents) and is a critical reason for the 
promotion of TURF programs. Additionally, many TURF programs divide a fishery into 
discrete spatial areas called “TURFs.” Fishers, groups of fishers, or the community are 
put in charge of the individual areas and manage them either independently or with some 
level of oversight by the fishery’s managing authority. 
Self-management proposals such as TURFs are becoming popular prescriptions 
for issues in Common Pool Resources around the world, however we need more research 
to make informed decisions. A major gap in the literature is the impact individual CPR 




areas to small-scale management areas to increase local control have the corollary of 
creating multiple management groups in close proximity. This raises important questions. 
Do members of different CPR user groups illegally harvest resources from other groups’ 
areas to such a degree higher overall harvests than before the resource was divided result 
(González et al., 2006; San Martín et al., 2010)? Do smaller scale groups manage their 
resources better than larger groups when there are other non-group users able to harvest 
from their resource (McCay, 2017; Orensanz and Parma, 2010)? There is not sufficient 
research on inter-CPR behaviors to answer questions about whether the benefits of small-
scale self-management programs diminish when the management groups interact with 
one another. 
Previous Experiments 
A lack of research on how multiple CPRs interact with and affect each other 
motivates this work. Economic experiments have been used extensively to examine a 
range of real-world policies (Banks et al., 2003; Falk and Heckman, 2009; Ishikida et al., 
1998). While experiments examining CPRs have been around for decades (Cass and 
Edney, 1978), spatial aspects like between neighboring CPRs have been neglected. 
Previous research does not include multiple CPRs interacting with each other and so has 
not determined their impacts on each other. Relevant experiments were absent until 
recently and merely examine the differences between an outside managed resource user 
group and a self-managing group. They find CPR user groups have difficulties managing 
illegal extracting from outside the group and establish suboptimal management programs. 
Experiments report different outcomes from communication between group members. 
This experiment determines how CPR user groups affect each other, strengthens the 
findings about the management regimes self-managing groups select, and adds evidence 
to the debate regarding the impacts management and communication have on outcomes 
(Abatayo and Lynham, 2016; Cardenas, 2000; Coleman, 2009). 
Relevant experimental papers are all within recent years (Abatayo and Lynham, 
2016; Arroyo-Mina and Guerrero, 2018; Chávez et al., 2018; Gallier et al., 2016; Santis 
and Chávez, 2015; Wakamatsu and Anderson, 2018). While some of the experiments are 




experiment are therefore more generalizable. Additionally, Chávez et al. (2018) find no 
significant differences between the behavior of Chilean fishers in a field experiment and 
university students in a laboratory experiment. Therefore even though my results are 
more generalizable than a field experiment and will apply well to wider range of 
contexts, they may still apply well to specific instances. 
Unlike previous experiments, this work analyzes CPRs in the context of the entire 
system of which they are a part. Most of the previous work analyzes whole CPRs 
converted into a single resource-wide management program. Sometimes when self-
management systems are established the original resource is divided into smaller 
management units (Aburto et al., 2013). This is to create more local management of 
resource stocks. Previous work only analyzing an entire resource converting to a single 
management regime misses the dynamics that occur between two management groups 
when a resource is divided. This experiment fills the critical gap in the literature about the 
impacts neighboring CPRs have on each other informing resource management policy 
around the world. 
 Chávez et al. (2018) conduct an experiment using two groups of 3 users 
harvesting 2 different colored locos (an abalone) in a shared fishery. The stocks of both 
locos are dynamic and have a threshold where if the stock ever falls below the threshold 
the management area for that colored loco will close. The participants play 5 different 
treatments of the game with either no poaching (no one can extract a different colored 
loco than has been assigned to them), poaching occurs (one group can harvest both types 
of loco), or there is poaching but user groups decide how much surveillance (the 
probability of someone illegally harvesting being caught) they will pay for to discourage 
poaching. The other two treatments are there is poaching but the government will provide 
a surveillance level of an 11.1% chance of catching people poaching, and finally a 
treatment where the government provides an 11.1% surveillance level and the players can 
augment that surveillance with additional money paid to raise the level. The authors find 
the groups have difficulty deterring poaching and establish suboptimal management 
regimes despite significant benefits from better regimes. Outside surveillance by the 




of self-managing user responses to poaching, the interaction between different CPR user 
groups remains unexplored. 
My experiment differs from Chávez et al. (2018) because they incorporate a 
dynamic stock aspect and do not include reciprocal inter-group dynamics. In their 
experiment one group of participants can communicate with each other and self-manage, 
while another group harvests from the main group’s resource. The asymmetric context is 
specific to a resource where only one group can harvest from another and does not 
analyze how different user groups affect each other back and forth. Using a TURF 
program in a fishery to illustrate, Chávez et al.’s experiment examines one TURF where 
outside poaching is a problem. My experiment has two TURFs connected together, a set-
up similar to some of the TURFs of Chile where neighboring groups of fishers negatively 
affect each other (Orensanz and Parma, 2010; San Martín et al., 2010). In addition, their 
set-up allows them to compare the outcomes from self-managing and full communication 
between all the relevant fishery users to self-managing and partial communication 
between all the users. Like my experiment, partial communication results from restricting 
your communication to half of the users of your resource. 
 De Geest et al. (2017) has a similar set-up to Chávez et al. (2018), with players in 
one CPR and “outsiders” able to extract from it, but uses a static extraction game with 
crowding effects similar to my experiment. Like me they conduct a laboratory 
experiment that does not frame the game in any context (such as a fishery), thereby 
allowing their results to be more generalizable. They find group members are able to 
cooperate with each other, but they are unable to control the level of extraction by 
outsiders. 
Previous experiments find self-managing CPR users do not select optimal 
management programs. An experiment by Velez et al. (2012) examines the management 
regimes users select to protect and manage their CPR. In their setting, strong enforcement 
efforts (either higher penalties for illegal harvesting or higher levels of surveillance) 
should theoretically always be preferred to lower levels. However in their experiment 
individuals implement inefficient and weak surveillance and penalty levels. Despite 
voting on important aspects of the enforcement regime and communicating with other 




penalties and low surveillance levels. 90% of groups implement such programs. 
Additionally, Janssen et al. (2013) report a field experiment where users break the rules 
they choose for themselves. I contribute to the CPR self-management literature by 
measuring the legal harvest limits and surveillance levels self-managing groups choose, 
as well as violations of the limits groups set for themselves. 
Communication and collective decision-making appear to improve outcomes in 
CPR experiments, but the effect is not universal. Communication and democratic rule-
making generally improve economic outcomes (Dal Bó et al., 2010); including in fishery 
contexts (del Pilar Moreno-Sánchez and Maldonado, 2010). Abatayo and Lynham (2016) 
find allowing CPR users to communicate about resource management leads to 
significantly lower – and more sustainable – extraction levels. Gallier et al. (2016) find 
similar effects in some of their experiment sites, but in others outside management 
suggestions perform better. Schmitt (2000) describes a CPR experiment where restricting 
communication in a group of harvesters to a subgroup of the harvesters effectively 
reduces cooperation. Velez et al. (2012) find communication does not reduce extraction 
to sustainable levels. The diverse findings indicate outcomes are dependent on local 
contexts and policies are not generalizable. While evidence suggests communication and 
endogenous management improve economic outcomes, the impact for some CPRs in 
experiments is mixed and we need more research to definitively confirm the impacts of 
communication and endogenous management. 
A large body of experimental research finds a minimal group paradigm and 
groupiness can lead to group biases forming and suboptimal outcomes. Minimal group 
paradigm argues groups form out-group biases and exhibit destructive behavior towards 
other groups even when group assignment seems random or is based on trivial things 
(Chen and Li, 2009; Diehl, 1990; Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2009; Tajfel et al., 1971; see 
Tajfel and Turner (2001) for an overview of early work on the subject). In addition, 
“groupiness” appears in experiments examining group competition (Kranton et al., 2018). 
Groupiness refers to a related phenomenon, where subjects become biased towards 
members of their own group and against members of other groups. In my experiment, 





Working with the experimental design of Abatayo and Lynham (2016) I can 
explicitly test behavioral group concepts like “us versus them” and groupiness, concepts 
not previously explored in CPR contexts but important for inter-CPR dynamics. The 
major findings of Abatayo and Lynham are communication improves outcomes relative 
to no communication and whether rules are exogenously imposed or endogenously 
selected does not impact efficiency. In extending their work, I find “groupiness” effects 
that persist regardless of any change in the ability to communicate and manage. 
Model 
The models of Abatayo and Lynham (2016) and Schnier (2009) guide us in 
determining the impacts neighboring management areas have on each other. I have two 
spatially distinct Common Pool Resources, and a constant number of agents able to 
extract from the CPR system, *. (^ identifies the extraction of user   in CPR d (d = 1,2). 

 is the value of extracting outside the CPRs. Users cannot extract more than an 
endowment, , from both CPR 1 and CPR 2: 
0 ≤ ∑ (^ ≤ _̂	   
The group’s returns are a function of the total extractions from both CPRs, T̂ , 
with each individual CPR’s return being given by Ê (T̂ ). There are no spatial-linkages 
between the CPRs where extractions in one directly impact the other. 
Each CPR’s yield function is given by the following standard quadratic functions: 
E	(T	) = (p	 − 	T	)T	  (1) 
and  
E_(T_) = (p_ − _T_)T_  (2) 
The first term in the parentheses shows the benefits of extracting from the group’s CPR, 
the second the costs. 
The private returns are shown by 
F)S & = 
( − (	 − (_) + {\;U; E	(T	) + {\|U| E_(T_)  (3) 
where 
{\]
U]  is  ’s share in the total extraction from CPR d. Users are profit-maximizers who 




earns more than the outside option, 
, initially, but as T̂  grows extraction eventually 
becomes less profitable. With identical , 
, and Ê , we can find the following symmetric 
Nash Equilibria: 
(	∗ = (~;4)(Q	)V;(Q	)|   (4) 
and 
(_∗ = (~|4)(Q	)V|(Q	)|   (5) 
In my experiment design both CPRs have identical parameters so p	 = p_ = p 
and 	 = _ = . With 
 = 0, we can simplify Equations (4) and (5) to: 
(	∗ = ~V(Q	)  (6) 
and 
(_∗ = ~V(Q	)  (7) 
With * members in a group, the total Symmetric Nash Equilibrium extraction in each 
CPR is: 
T̂∗ = X Q	[ ~V  (8) 
The socially optimal level of extraction maximizes profits for the entire group. To 
find the socially optimal level chosen by a Social Planner, we use the objective function: 
max{U;U|} ⋯ 
(* − T	 − T_) + E	(T	) + E_(T_)  (9) 
given aggregate extractions cannot exceed aggregate endowments (∑ ∑ (^ ≤ *_̂		 ). 
The socially optimal extractions for the group are: 
T	 = _V|(~;4)V;V|   (10) 
and 
T_ = _V;(~|4)V;V|   (11) 
With 




T̂ = ~_V   (12) 
The individual socially optimal extractions are: 
(̂ = (	)( ~_V)  (13) 
Extractions in the Nash Equilibrium are unsurprisingly higher than the socially 
optimal extractions. 
 
The above model describes extracting from two CPRs. For users only able to 
extract from a single CPR, the above extraction amounts for each CPR hold for the lone 
CPR. By removing CPR 2 from the model (a simple operation because there are no 
linkages between the CPRs) we identify the socially optimal extractions for the group and 
individual as: 
T = ~_V and ( = (	)( ~_V). 
The Nash Equilibrium extractions are: 
T∗ = X Q	[ ~V and (∗ = X 	Q	[ ~V  
To directly compare extraction levels between CPR set-ups we can see: 
T∗ = X Q	[ ~V is half of T	∗ + T_∗ = X Q	[ ~V + X Q	[ ~V  
and 
T = ~_V is half of T	 + T_ = X ~_V[ + X ~_V[ 
Individuals with two CPRs to extract from behave like individuals with a single 
CPR to extract from, for each of their two independent CPRs. A management regime for 
the CPR(s) and the possibility of violating the regime is the final component of the 
model. 
Management and Fines 
With homogenous, risk-neutral profit-maximizers and a wage of 0 outside the 




F)S &^ = α(̂ − (̂ qT̂ r 
In reality users of many CPRs, and by definition all TURFs, have the ability to 
enact management regimes to create and enforce limits on extractions. Stronger 
enforcement of the extraction rules costs users more money than weaker enforcement of 
regulations so the profit function for CPR users becomes: 
F)S &^ = α(̂ − (̂ qT̂ r − !*!t'*& ,&^ 
!*!t'*& ,& represents the cost to each player to provide the given level of 
management for their group’s CPR. 
 
Finally, I also allow for individual violations of account extraction regulations to 
be punishable by a fine on the individual. Since extracting benefits you privately and the 
costs are shared with everyone else extracting from the CPR, there is an individual 
incentive to extract more. The socially optimal level balances the benefits and costs for 
the group, but cheating by extracting more while everyone else cooperates and extracts at 
the socially optimal level earns you more money. It is therefore in your personal interest 
to extract more while everyone else extracts at the lower level. The fine in the experiment 
is set to the profit a user gains by extracting at the optimal cheating level, (,̂, when 
everyone else in their group extracts from CPR^ at the socially optimal level, (,^ . 
E *,^ = F)S &,^q(,̂q(,^ r, (,^ r − F)S &,^((,^ , (,^ ) (14) 
where (,̂q(,^ r = ~(	)V{:\,]_V  
for user  . 
(,̂q(,^ r is found by solving as we have above, but without symmetric actions 
by all the agents. 
F)S &,^ = α(,^ − (,^qT,^r 
                                        = α(,^ − (,^ X(,^ +  (,^ [ 
F)S &,^(,^ = α(,^ −  2(,^ +  (,^




⟹ (,^ = p −  ∑ (,^

2  




Accounting for a fine of a proportion of your profits, , we have: 
F)S &^ = (1 − θ)hα(̂ − (̂ qT̂ ri − !*!t'*& ,& (15) 
if   violates the extracting limit each period, and  
F)S &^ = α(̂ − (̂ qT̂ r − !*!t'*& ,& (16) 
if   does not violate the rules. 
 
A real-world example of the model is a fishery where fishers spend their time ( 
units) working in the fishery (harvesting ( fish per unit of time) or pursuing outside labor 
(earning 
 per unit of time). Fish are sold on the market place at a set price (p), but the 
cost to catch fish increases the more time others spend harvesting from the fishery (T̂ ). 
A solitary, outside managed group account represents the typical government managed 
fishery. Connected self-managing group accounts represent a regime with multiple 
TURFs. 
 
Assuming symmetric outcomes, management and fines do not change the Nash 
Equilibria. 
F)S & = 
( − (	 − (_) + (	T	 E	(T	) +
(_T_ E_(T_) − !*!t'*& ,& 
= 
( − (	 − (_) + p(	 − (	 (T	) + p(_ − (_ (T_) − !*!t'*& ,& 




F)S & = 
( − (	 − (_) + (1 − c)hp(,	 − (,	(T	)i + (c)=p(,	 − (,	(T	)](1
− θ) + (1 − c)=p(,_ − (,_(T_)] + (c)=p(,_ − (,_(T_)](1 − θ)
− !*!t'*& ,& 
If (	 is below the extracting limit for the CPR, there is no risk of a fine and 
\
{;  is unaffected by the presence of management.  
(	∗ =  1* + 1
p
 
If the socially optimal extraction is below the limit for the CPR, there is no risk of 





The presence of a management regime punishing other group extracting affects 
\
{| . But the effect does not impact your optimal other group extraction. The other 
group extraction amount from before the introduction of management is still optimal. 
F)S &(_ = −
 + (1 − c)=p − 2(_ − (* − 1)(_]
+ (c)=p − 2(_ − (* − 1)(_](1 − θ) 
For both solitary groups and connected groups where the socially optimal 
extraction is below the limit, the presence of management and fines do not impact the 
optimal harvest. 
Without management (∗ = X 	Q	[ ~V and ( = (	)( ~_V) in a solitary group’s 
account, or in each group account for connected groups. Under management, we derive 
the same result as without management, but multiplied by a constant. The constant falls 
away when we identify the Nash Equilibrium and socially optimal extraction levels. 
F)S &( = −
 + (1 − c)=p − 2( − (* − 1)(] + (c)=p − 2(




= =1 − θc]=p − (* + 1)(] = 0 
⇒ =1 − θc]p = =1 − θc]=(* + 1)(] 
⇒ (∗ =  1* + 1
p
 
The presence of management does not impact the Nash Equilibrium extraction 
level. Management also does not change the socially optimal extraction level. 
F)S &( = −
 + (1 − c)=p − 2*(] + (c)=p − 2*(](1 − θ) 
= =1 − θc]=p − 2*(] = 0 
⇒ =1 − θc]p = =1 − θc]=2*(] 





The experiment is a common pool resource game similar to Abatayo and Lynham 
(2016). Each Period the group members decide how many tokens to extract from a 
“group account” CPR they share with either 2 or 5 other people. They are given an 
endowment to spend each Period. The endowment may be spent either extracting tokens 
or on the outside activity (the activity paying a set amount per unit in the model). I set the 
outside wage, 
, to zero, so players only earn Experimental Dollars from the tokens they 
extract. The design is a classic 2x2 experiment. The control of players over setting 
harvest limits and enforcement of those limits is the within subject treatment. Whether 
the group account is split into two connected sub-accounts or kept together in a solitary 
account is the between subject treatment. 
The profit earned each Period is a constant individual payoff from each token 
extracted minus a term accounting for total extraction from the account in the Period and 




extraction by everyone in the group account becomes T̂ (= ∑ (,^). The strategy set for 
users is between 0 and  in each Period. 
One half of experiment Sessions have participants play the game in solitary 
groups with a large group account shared by 6 people. The other half of Sessions have 
players in groups of 3 people who share smaller accounts and can interact with the group 
account of another group of 3 people. Group members can only extract tokens from their 
account in the solitary groups. Players are able to extract a certain number of tokens 
legally from their group’s account, but they can also illegally extract above the legal 
limit. Players in the connected group treatment have the additional option to extract from 
the other group’s account illegally. I call the act of extracting tokens from the other 
group’s account “poaching.”  
Specifying the model’s parameters allows us to assign numerical values to the 
equilibria.  = 20, 
 = 0, and p = 15.  = 0.25 in connected groups and  = 0.125 in 
solitary groups.  is half as large in solitary groups as in connected groups to reflect the 
greater relative impact the removal of a token has in a smaller account. The 6-person 
group set-up represents an entire solitary fishery and the two 3-person group set-up 
represents a larger fishery divided into two sub-fisheries. You can imagine removing one 
fish in an ecosystem encompassing half of a fishery being twice as impactful to the other 
fishers there as it would be to the fishers in a whole larger fishery; hence the difference in 
s. With * = 6 we can fully parameterize the functions and find the equilibria for the 
experiment. 
Without considering management, simplifying the general Nash Equilibrium 
equations of the model, (6) and (7), leads to (	∗ = 8.57 and (_∗ = 8.57 together totaling 
17.14 tokens. The results suggest a strategy of extracting 8.57 tokens from your group’s 
account and poaching 8.57 from the other group’s account.  
For solitary groups,  = 0.125, and there is only one account. We therefore 
find (∗ = 17.14. 
Total group extractions at the Nash level are T∗ = 102.86 for the solitary group 




Parameterizing the socially optimal extractions for the connected group accounts 
(Equations (12) and (13)) gives T	 = 5 and T_ = 5 leading to a total ( = 10. T =
60. 
For solitary groups with 1 account we have ( = 10, also with T = 60. 
Both group size treatments have the same socially optimal and Symmetric Nash 
Equilibrium extraction levels. Solitary and connected group members each extract 17.14 
tokens in total at the Nash Equilibrium. The socially optimal individual extraction level is 
10 tokens for both connected and solitary groups.  
The socially optimal total extraction, T, is 60 tokens (each connected group 
account has a total socially optimal extraction of 30, and both together is a total socially 
optimal extraction of 60 tokens). Players earn 75 Experimental Dollars extracting at the 
socially optimal level. 
Total Nash Equilibrium extraction is T∗ = 102.86 (again, summing up the 
extractions of two connected groups of 3 people or a single solitary group of 6 people). 
Players earn 36.75 Experimental Dollars extracting at the Nash level. Nash extraction for 
connected groups is identical to solitary groups because both group treatments occupy 
systems with 6 users and utilize accounts with s proportional to their fraction of the 
overall system. 
Management and Fines 
The next aspect of the experiment reflects the presence of externally provided 
resource management or the self-provision of management. In half of a Session’s 
treatments the management regime is set outside the group by the experimenter 
(representing the role of the government in a typical real-world fishery). The outside 
management sets a limit, or “cap,” on how many tokens each individual user can legally 
extract from their group account each Period. In a TURF context, the cap represents a 
fishing limit. Anything you extract above your cap is considered illegal and there is a 
percentage chance your illegal extracting will be discovered. The chance of being found 
is the “level of surveillance.” Managed users pay a set fee each Period to cover the costs 
of the regime and are told the cap and level of surveillance at the start of each Period. 
Self-managing groups democratically choose the cap and the level of surveillance before 




In-game violations of account extraction regulations are punishable by a fine. 
Extracting at the optimal cheating level while everyone else cooperates and extracts at the 
socially optimal level earns you the highest amount of Experimental Dollars. The 
model’s fine is set to the profit a user gains by extracting at the optimal cheating level, 
(,̂, when everyone else in their group extracts at the socially optimal level, Equation 
(14). 
Using the parameters set for the experiment, F)S &,^q(,̂q(,^ r, (,^ r = 100 
and therefore E *,^ = 25% (100-75). Since users are never able to change the size of 
the fine, it is never more than 25 Experimental Dollars. Since there is no 100% possibility 
of being discovered violating the regulations, only being fined the profit from violating is 
not enough to deter rational users.5 If self-managing users choose the maximum level of 
surveillance available, 50%, the fine of 25% of your profits for breaking the management 
rules is too low to effectively deter poaching. Thus we have weak enforcement of the 
rules. I create a regime with weak enforcement because that is the norm in most CPRs 
including fisheries (Sutinen et al., 1990). Other experiments follow similar procedures 
(Abatayo and Lynham, 2016; Chávez et al., 2018). 
Accounting for the fine, we have the following profit functions for extracting 
from your group’s CPR: F)S &^ = 0.75h15(̂ − (̂ qT̂ ri − !*!t'*& ,&^ if a 
user is found violating the cap, and F)S &^ = 15(̂ − (̂ qT̂ r − !*!t'*& ,&^ if 
a user extracts below or at the extraction cap. 
 
Under the outside management regime, the socially optimal extraction strategy is 
to extract 10 tokens from your own group’s account. Following the strategy maximizes 
total wealth for the group, but it is not an equilibrium as it is always better for the 
individual to harvest 11 tokens than 10. With a management regime consisting of a cap of 
12 and a surveillance level of 10%, the total socially optimal extraction amount for an 
individual, (̂ = 10, is below the cap. Each token you extract from the other account is 
                                                 
5 The fine is not large enough because the maximum you can earn from cheating is 25 Experimental 
Dollars, the fine will only equal 25 Experimental Dollars when you are caught optimally cheating and 
everyone else cooperates. Additionally, taking into account the chance of being fined, the expected fine 




at a 10% risk of being fined. Therefore the expected utility from a token harvested from 
your group’s account (with zero chance of incurring a fine) is higher and you will extract 
all 10 tokens from your group’s account. 
0.10 ¡F)S &¢(¢ £ (0.75) + (0.90) ¡
F)S &¢(¢ £ ≤  ¤
F)S &^(̂ ¥            
ℎ* (̂ ≤ 12 
The socially optimal harvest level is the same under management as it is without. 
The management regulations merely adjust where individuals harvest their 10 tokens 
between CPRs in the connected setting. The socially optimal harvest is also below the 
cap for the solitary groups (12) and so management has no effect on the socially optimal 
harvest amount in solitary settings. 
Assuming symmetric outcomes, we can see that management and fines do not 
affect the Nash Equilibrium. With a Nash Equilibrium above the cap, players extracting 
at the Nash level are at risk of being fined. 
Under outside management, the Nash Equilibrium harvest in the solitary groups is 
the same as we found without considering management, ( = 17.14. 
Under outside management, the Nash Equilibrium spatial distribution of token 
extraction between connected groups is the same as without the management program. 
The distribution of tokens without management is 8.57 in each account, an amount below 
the own-group harvest cap of 12. Therefore the cap does not impact your extraction from 
your own group account. Meanwhile, extracting 8.57 tokens from the other group’s 
account maximizes your discounted profit function without management and fines. The 
possibility of being fined for extracting from the other group merely acts as a constant 
multiplied by the profit function. Players still extract at the same level in the Nash 
Equilibrium. Therefore extractions from the two accounts remain symmetric between 
them at the same levels as they were when there was no management regime. 
The Nash Equilibrium for both CPRs is the same under management as it is 
without management. 
\
{;  is unaffected by the presence of management when your 
own group extraction is below the harvest cap. So the same own group extraction is 
optimal, (	 = 8.57. \{|  is affected by the presence of management. But the effect 





The presence of management and fines do not impact the Nash Equilibrium. 
Solitary group members harvest the same number of tokens under management as they 
do without management. Similarly, connected group members at the Nash Equilibrium 
harvest the same number of tokens from their group and from the other group under 
management as they do without management. Table 3.I summarizes the theoretical 
predictions. Since solitary groups and connected groups harvest the same overall amounts 
as each other in the Nash Equilibrium and have identical socially optimal harvest levels, 
and management and fines do not introduce any differences, we should not see any 
differences in harvests between solitary groups and connected groups. Behaviorally based 
concepts and explanations such as groupiness would best explain any differences in 
harvests. 
Hypotheses 
The experimental design allows me to test the hypotheses that group division and 
self-managing will impact outcomes. Impacts will suggest the presence of behavioral 
factors CPR management proposals need to consider before dividing a resource into 
separate management entities. 
In the absence of such behavioral factors, there should be no difference in 
extractions between a large united group and two smaller divided groups. Theory, the 
model, and the specific parameterization of the experiment predict there will be no 
differences. Both group set-ups have a socially optimal extraction amount of 10 tokens 
per individual and a Nash Equilibrium amount of 17.14 tokens per individual. 
Hypothesis 1: Cooperative and sustainable behavior of 
connected groups will be statistically significantly 
different from behavior of solitary groups. 
I test Hypothesis 1 using the number of tokens harvested, players’ profits, 
management regimes (the levels of surveillance and extraction caps set), and regulation 
violations (the frequency and magnitude of violations of caps). 
Despite predictions by models of group decision-making, small-scale self-




locally made decisions than decisions made at more distant levels. Because individuals in 
smaller group sizes feel more empowered to impact their outcomes (Agrawal and Goyal, 
2001), the smaller connected groups may feel the regulations and outcomes are more 
responsive to group members and outperform larger solitary groups. Poaching activity 
from outside the group may mitigate the effect by introducing a force in the connected 
groups’ environments they do not feel able to control. Users who do not feel able to have 
an impact might not behave in a socially optimal way and might behave selfishly. 
However, the poachers merely replace other group members from the 6-person solitary 
group set-up. Players in connected groups should still feel more empowered in their 
smaller group. Dividing groups allows me to explicitly test the idea of “groupiness” by 
measuring cooperative behavior towards own-group players and non-cooperative 
behavior towards other-group players. The experiment directly compares predictions of 
group theory and behavioral precepts of small-scale self-management theories in 
describing observed behavior. 
Previous work regarding endogenous enforcement decisions and management in 
CPR experiments indicates endogenously determined rules are more effective and 
followed more regularly than exogenously imposed rules attempting to achieve efficient 
management. Villena and Chavez (2005) go so far as to suggest CPRs will be unable to 
avoid overharvesting without endogenous regulation. Previous research indicates I will 
be unable to reject the hypothesis below. 
 Hypothesis 2: Self-managing groups will report 
statistically significantly different measures of 
cooperative and sustainable behavior from outside 
managed groups. 
I will test Hypothesis 2 using the numbers of tokens harvested, the players’ 
profits, the levels of surveillance and harvest caps set, and the frequency and magnitude 
of violations of set harvest caps. I expect self-managing groups to show lower token 
extraction levels, higher profits, higher levels of surveillance and lower harvest caps set 






A total of 108 undergraduate and graduate students were recruited at a public 
university in the United States and paid based on their performance in the game.6 
Participants played two Cycles of the game in the fall of 2018. A Cycle is 10 Periods of 
the same CPR game under the same management regime (outside management or self-
managing). To prevent order effects the order participants play management treatments is 
randomized. Cycle describes whether subjects are in the first treatment they play or the 
second. The experiment was conducted using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
Participants received a show-up fee of $10 and the average payout at the end of the game 
was $18.92. The payout was based on each Experimental Dollar earned by participants 
being worth $0.01 USD. 56.25% of participants were female, the average grade level of 
the students was a junior, and most participants had not previously participated in an 
economic experiment. I used previous experiments (Abatayo and Lynham (2016), De 
Geest et al. (2017),  Chávez et al. (2018) among others) as a guide to determine the 
sample size needed in this experiment. A power analysis was not completed prior to 
running the experiment to determine the sample size for between subject and within 
subject samples. 
To begin their experiment Session, each player discovers whether they are in a 
solitary group of 6 people or in a connected group of 3 people. The players answer a short 
demographic survey (their major, gender, experience with economic experiments, etc.), 
complete 3 questions confirming their comprehension of the game, and begin playing the 
first Cycle. Participants play both management treatment Cycles (in random order) and 
                                                 
6 A total of 120 students were recruited but 2 participants left their Sessions a couple Periods before the 
end. They left descriptions of their strategies and activities in the game up to their departure, and gave 
instructions on how the experimenter should play the game from their computer after they left. These 
instructions were detailed and gameplay continued seemingly uninterrupted for the final Periods. I 
remove the subjects’ data and the data from the rest of the members of their solitary group or connected 
groups (for the entire Session) from the analysis due to concerns regarding validity. I therefore report 
findings from the remaining 108 players. Including the full sample gives comparable results to what I 
report, but with higher statistical power. I did not run an additional session to reach 120 participants 





finally are paid for participating in the experiment. All decisions made in the game are 
anonymous.7 
When extracting in the outside management treatments, players are told they can 
extract up to and including 12 tokens from their group’s account legally. If you harvest 
above the “cap,” there is a 10% chance the computer will find you harvesting above the 
cap and will assess you a penalty of 25% of your profits. The cap and percentage chance 
of being fined were chosen based on the methods and results found in Abatayo and 
Lynham (2016). Both my experiment and theirs select them because the set cap is just 
above the social optimal level (10 tokens) and the level of surveillance (10%) is too small 
to discourage uncooperative behavior. Furthermore, the cap and surveillance level are 
almost identical to the average cap and surveillance level participants in an unpaid pilot 
Session chose. In a similar experiment, the level of surveillance is set at 11.1% for almost 
identical reasons to mine (Chávez et al., 2018). 
In the self-managing treatments, before the players make any decisions about 
harvesting, they discuss and vote on the management regime. Each Period they first 
communicate with their group members during a 2 minute chat. A chat feature in the z-
tree software allows players to type and send instant messages anonymously. After 2 
minutes they see a screen where they vote on the cap for the Period. The median vote 
from the group is chosen to be the cap. After voting on the cap concludes, the players see 
a similar screen where they vote for the level of surveillance for the Period. They choose 
a level from 0-50% in 10% increments and the median vote from the group is the level 
chosen. The surveillance level determines the percentage chance the computer will 
discover a group member exceeding the cap, or someone from the other group who is 
poaching from your group’s account. If the computer discovers you, you are fined 25% of 
your profits. The fines collected do not go to the players but go to the computer. Each 
level of surveillance has a cost that is assessed to each player (Table 3.II). The levels 
increase in cost so there is realistic diminishing returns from surveillance. The 
endogenous management construction is the same as Abatayo and Lynham (2016). 
The levels of surveillance self-managing players can select are chosen based on 
the levels in Abatayo and Lynham (2016). The range allows me to examine cooperation 
                                                 




and management decisions in settings where enforcement is weak. 0% is the minimum an 
account could be surveilled, 50% is the maximum percentage chance to intercept 
someone illegally harvesting. 50% is the most real-world TURFs could expect to surveil, 
fisheries are almost always at an even lower surveillance level (Sutinen and Kuperan, 
1999). In addition to low surveillance levels, many CPRs have relatively small fines for 
violations (Cardenas et al., 2000). 
In both outside management and self-managing treatments the penalty for 
violating regulations is confiscating 25% of an illegal harvester’s profits. The penalty in 
the experiment is based on the value in Abatayo and Lynham (2016), reflects the 
relatively low penalties most fishery managers render, and represents penalties which are 
too low to effectively discourage illegal fishing (Sutinen et al., 1990).  
Players in the self-managing solitary groups have full communication between all 
the relevant resource users. Self-managing connected groups have only partial 
communication between all the relevant users (players can communicate with their own 
group members, but not with members of the other group who can poach from their 
account). 
This experiment design enables examination of local user management – 
specifically self-management, devolving the level of decision-making, and inter-CPR 
aspects – on profitability, sustainability, responsibility, and criminality. 
Results 
 Self-managing groups outperform outside managed groups and solitary groups 
outperform connected groups. For each dependent variable I report the findings of the 
preferred random effects regression model, or logistic regression model for a specific 
aspect of rule violations.8 Comparing to outside managed players, self-managing players 
harvest fewer tokens (thus increasing their incomes) and choose higher levels of 
surveillance to catch illegal harvesting than the set outside management regime. 
Connected group players harvest more tokens than solitary group players resulting in 
lower incomes for them. Solitary group members harvest more tokens from their own 
                                                 
8 Previous experimental research uses random effects rather than fixed effects (Abatayo and Lynham, 
2016; Chávez et al., 2018) and diagnostics indicate random effects are better in this context. Running 




group account on average than connected players (13.99 versus 11.31 tokens) and extract 
3.31 tokens over the cap when they break the cap. Cap breakers in connected groups only 
take 1.86 tokens over on average. However, because connected group members also 
poach, they extract more tokens overall than solitary groups members (16.81 tokens 
versus 13.99 tokens). Additionally, self-managing solitary groups choose lower harvest 
cap management regimes. Inter-CPR effects are larger than the effects from allowing 
players to communicate and self-manage. Regressions support the patterns in Table 3.III. 
Mann-Whitney statistical tests find significant differences in means between 
treatment groups. I find the differences in mean total harvest, own group extraction, cap 
selection, percentage of group exceeding the cap, amount above the cap extracted, and 
profit between group size treatments and management treatments are statistically 
significant at the 1% level using a Mann-Whitney two sample statistic test. Differences in 
mean surveillance levels chosen and poaching amounts are not statistically significant. 
My larger solitary groups exhibit a stronger impact from self-managing and 
communicating than Abatayo and Lynham’s smaller groups report. The average 
extraction in Abatayo and Lynham’s 3-person solitary groups is 12.03 for self-managing 
able to communicate and 13.64 for outside managed groups unable to communicate.9 The 
average extraction in my self-managing solitary groups of 6 people is 12.76 (0.22) tokens 
a Period and 15.22 (0.21) for outside managed solitary groups. Larger solitary groups 
experience a greater positive impact from being able to communicate and set their own 
management regime. 
If we only examine the harvest behavior within our outside-managed groups, we 
find a difference in average total harvests that is unrelated to the communication effect 
Abatayo and Lynham describe. Outside-managed connected groups harvest 16.12 tokens 
but outside-managed solitary groups harvest 12.76 tokens. 
                                                 
9 In their paper, Abatayo and Lynham divide their results by Session Cycle. The per-Cycle average token 
extractions they report are 13.21 (0.64) in the first Cycle and 10.84 (0.37) in the second Cycle for 
endogenous management. For exogenous management they are 13.05 (0.65) and 13.26 (0.64) for rules 
generated by another group unable to communicate, and 13.58 (0.38) and 14.68 (0.48) for rules 





The profits of players in the solitary groups are consistently larger than those in 
the connected groups. The difference between group-sizes is substantial. Players in 
connected groups earn 20.28 Experimental Dollars less each Period than members of 
solitary groups (Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.2 indicates player profits in the groups able to collectively decide upon 
the management for their resource are higher overall than for outside managed players. 
Table 3.IV identifies a temporal aspect where outside managed players exhibit decreasing 
incomes over time. Each Period of the game outside managed players earn 1.08 
Experimental Dollars less than the previous Period (Table 3.IV Column (3)).10 The 
pattern holds over all the Periods participants play after the first Period, self-managing 
players always earn more than outside managed players. But while the overall effect is 
economically significant the difference in incomes is not as large as the difference 
between connected and solitary groups (16.64 Experimental Dollars each Period in the 
preferred model, Table 3.IV Column (3)). 
 Players earn 4.92 fewer Experimental Dollars in the second Cycle than in the first. 
Each experiment a player previously played leads to an additional 3.76 Experimental 
Dollars. 
Harvest Behavior 
Group size significantly effects harvest behavior, and individuals in self-
managing groups harvest less each Period while outside managed individuals harvest 
more each Period. Poaching leads to higher total harvests, and since poaching only occurs 
for connected groups it drives the difference in harvests between the group treatments. 
Table 3.V gives a breakdown of the important covariates affecting harvesting. 
Table 3.V Column (3) shows solitary group members extract more from their 
group account, supporting the findings of Table 3.III. Though there is a significant effect 
in Column (1), at first glance it may appear there is no difference between the group 
treatments in Columns (2) and (3). However, looking at the coefficient on Poaching, we 
see the driving force behind the significant, positive coefficient on Solitary Group in 
                                                 
10 Self-managing players earn an additional 0.43 Experimental Dollars each period, but the amount is not 




Column (1). In a connected group you can poach from the other group’s account. There is 
nowhere else to extract from in the solitary groups. Poaching acts as an escape valve for 
own group extraction, though previous poaching and poaching by the other group raise 
you own group extraction a little. Poaching necessarily externalizes token extraction, 
giving the appearance of higher harvests in solitary groups. The total tokens solitary 
groups harvest may not necessarily be larger than the totals connected groups harvest if 
we take poaching into account, as I do in Columns (6)-(8). Meanwhile, self-managing 
decreases extractions from your group’s account each Period (Column (3)). Finally, more 
experience with experiments increases the number of tokens you extract. 
Table 3.V Column (5) indicates the amount the other group poached from your 
group’s account, the level of surveillance for your group account, and time raise your 
extraction from the other group’s account. Theory predicts high poaching levels will 
encourage higher extractions from your own account and from the other group’s account. 
Theoretically, violations by others leads to more violations by you because compliance 
with rules is frequently a result of you believing other people will comply as well (Young, 
1979). Communicating and voting with other group members about management could 
increase your belief group members will cooperate. We see this in own group extracting 
behavior where self-managing leads to lower harvests over time. While you could just 
extract less from your account and poach more from the other account, we see no pattern 
of self-managing impacting levels of poaching. However, higher poaching by the other 
group leads to you poaching more. Another interesting finding is the higher the 
probability of being caught breaking your group’s harvest cap, the more you extract from 
the other group. Changing accounts to target for illegal extracting suggests higher 
surveillance levels displace extraction behavior spatially between accounts. Finally, your 
experience with other economic experiments lowers the amount you poach. 
Combining own-group and out-group harvest, connected groups harvest more 
tokens overall than solitary groups while outside managed groups harvest 0.099 more 
tokens each Period and self-managing groups harvest 0.179 fewer tokens each Period 
than the last. Both management groups harvest statistically similar levels initially (Table 
3.V Column (8)). Because solitary groups do not have another group’s account to extract 




the total number of tokens you harvest. Total harvest is your extraction from your solitary 
group’s account, or the sum of your extraction from your group’s account and another 
group’s account for connected group members. Smaller groups lead to more cooperative 
behavior with your group members (lower own group harvesting). But the cooperation is 
subsidized by non-cooperative behavior towards the other group (more poaching), fitting 
the idea of groupiness. The result is higher overall levels of harvesting.  
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the overall treatment effects the harvest regressions 
identify. They show the average total harvest of solitary groups is 2.82 tokens lower than 
the average in connected groups and self-managing reduces average token harvest by 
1.92 tokens overall. 
Management and Enforcement 
Table 3.VI indicates self-managing groups choose higher surveillance levels than 
the suboptimal level the government provides. Solitary groups choose caps 1.42 tokens 
lower than connected groups on average (Table 3.III). Groups in the second Cycle choose 
caps 1.806 higher than groups in the first Cycle and each additional experiment the group 
has previously played on average increases the cap by 2.382 (Table 3.VI Column (2)). 
The number of tokens the other group previously poached from your account lowers the 
cap you choose, indicating groups attempt to choose optimal caps in the face of external 
extracting. The higher the surveillance level the other group chose the previous Period, 
the higher the surveillance level your group chooses (Column (5)). A 10% increase in the 
other group’s surveillance level leads to a 2.69% increase in the surveillance your group 
chooses the next Period. Players may worry the other group’s higher surveillance will 
cause members of their group to harvest more from their own account next Period 
because they anticipate the surveillance will be too high next Period to safely poach. 
Therefore a higher surveillance level by the other group encourages your group to set a 
higher surveillance rate to prevent a rush of own-group extracting. The average 
surveillance level all self-managing groups choose is 18.34% (Table 3.III). 10% is the 
level outside management provides. T-tests confirm that self-managing groups are 
statistically different from outside management in terms of the caps and levels of 




Comparing my self-managing, solitary, 6-person groups to Abatayo and 
Lynham’s self-managing, solitary, 3-person groups, I find my solitary groups choose 
comparable harvest caps, but significantly higher surveillance levels. The groups in 
Abatayo and Lynham choose an average cap of 10.30 (0.58) and a surveillance level of 
5.13% (2.45). My groups choose a cap of 10.49 (0.21) and a surveillance level of 17.70% 
(1.12) (Table 3.III). 
Illegal Activity 
Summary statistics indicate solitary group members are more likely to extract 
more from the group account than the cap (Table 3.III). 16% more members of solitary 
groups violate their group’s cap than in connected groups (a difference of about 1 
member violating in connected groups versus 3 members in solitary groups) (Figure 3.5). 
Besides more frequently violating the cap, they extract statistically significantly more 
tokens (1.45 more) when they break the cap than connected group members do when they 
break the cap (Table 3.III). This is unsurprising given connected groups can use their 
effort to extract from another group’s account instead of their own.  
However, solitary groups may not necessarily be more felonious; “groupiness” 
may explain the findings. In Table 3.VII solitary group members appear to show lower 
levels of harvest cap violations than connected group members. Poaching behavior drives 
the difference between the coefficients on Solitary Group in Table 3.VII (Columns (2) 
and (3)) and the summary statistics. The more you poach the less likely you are to break 
the cap and when you do you harvest less above the cap. Connected players poach an 
average of 5.5 tokens. Given the coefficient on Poaching (Column (3)), the effect from 
poaching more than offsets the effect from Solitary Group indicating solitary members 
violate their cap less frequently. The pattern suggests poaching is a substitute for own-
group harvesting (the coefficient on Solitary Group in Column (1) supports the idea by 
indicating Solitary Groups violate their cap more frequently when poaching is not 
controlled for), illustrating the concept of “groupiness.” Smaller group sizes in the 
connected treatment lead to more cooperative behavior within your own group, 
cooperation that is subsidized by non-cooperative behavior toward the other group. In 
fact, because poaching significantly explains whether you violate your own group’s cap, 




Without considering interaction effects, self-managing group members break the 
cap less, and when they do they break it to a smaller extent (Columns (2) and (5)). But 
when interaction effects are considered, being involved in management decision-making 
has no impact on your likelihood to violate the cap you just voted on (Column (3)). 
Unsurprisingly, higher caps lead to fewer and smaller violations of the cap. More 
individuals break the cap in the second Cycle than in the first, and when they do they 
harvest more than cap breakers in the first Cycle. Higher levels of surveillance lead to 
fewer tokens taken above the cap, and discourage players from breaking the cap without 
considering interactions (Columns (2) and (5)). 
The proportion of players breaking their group’s harvest cap and the amount they 
extract above the cap are affected differently by the demographic covariates collected 
(Columns (3) and (6)). Environmental Economics majors extract statistically fewer 
tokens above the cap when they break the cap. Each additional experiment you have 
participated in previously increases how many tokens you harvest above the cap. 
 
Self-managing a shared common pool resource improves measures of user 
incomes, resource extraction amounts, and the management programs enacted while 
dividing a shared resource and its users into smaller groups lowers such measures. Self-
managing groups have lower token harvest levels, greater levels of rule enforcement, and 
higher profits. Solitary group accounts experience lower harvest levels, their members 
choose more efficient management parameters, and they are more profitable than 
connected group accounts. While connected groups are more cooperative within their 
smaller groups, they exhibit a larger degree of non-cooperative behavior outside their 
group, raising their overall harvest levels and lowering their collective incomes. 
Groupiness explains the patterns of cooperation we see. Completing the management and 
enforcement and illegal activity analyses for only the first Cycle of the game participants 
play does not find learning effects which unexpectedly and significantly bias the results. 
Discussion 
My experiment suggests self-managing improves outcomes while dividing users 
reduces outcome measures. The experiment measures user incomes, extraction levels, the 




“Self-managing groups will report statistically significantly different measures of 
cooperative and sustainable behavior from outside managed groups.” Incomes are 23% 
higher for self-managing users than for outside managed users on average. Furthermore, 
self-managing groups choose higher levels of surveillance than the suboptimal level the 
set outside management provides. I am unable to reject Hypothesis 1, “Behavior of 
connected groups will be statistically significantly different from behavior of solitary 
groups.” Players in connected management areas harvest more and earn less. Incomes are 
37% lower in connected areas than in solitary areas. Solitary users harvest less, select 
lower legal harvest limits, and earn more profits than users in connected areas. Since the 
group treatment effect is larger than the management effect, the results indicate resources 
managed by traditional central authorities will overall report better outcomes than self-
managed resources split into separate groups. 
Finding positive impacts of self-management and communication follows others 
in the literature (Viteri and Chávez, 2007). The findings are encouraging for programs like 
TURFs because they depend on self-management of resources. However, in this 
experimental design, outside management is always set to suboptimal levels. In reality 
outside management can be set at levels better than the levels the self-managing groups 
select here. Further work needs to analyze results when outside management is set to 
more optimal levels. Additionally, it is important to remember Abatayo and Lynham 
(2016) and Hayo and Vollan (2012) argue user communication is the deciding factor for 
efficiency, more than whether the management was exogenous or endogenous. Finally, 
before applying the results to policy-making decision-makers must remember in addition 
to success stories there are also many cautionary tales of self-management programs 
failing in the real-world (Estrin, 2010; Ness and Azzellini, 2011). 
Some CPR management programs like TURFs divide a resource and users into 
subgroups based on spatial areas, but my research indicates division can lead to 
suboptimal outcomes. Theoretically there should be no difference in the extraction 
patterns between the solitary and connected group treatments (Bramoullé et al., 2014; 
Bramoullé and Kranton, 2015). However there are different results due to behavioral 
reasons. The act of separating a single group of people into two groups creates a feeling 




al., 2018). Once the other group is seen as an “other,” participants no longer see them as 
people to cooperate with, but people to compete with and exploit. Other experiments find 
similar results. An experiment dividing people merely based on which of 2 paintings they 
prefer finds group bias forming and subjects treating people in the other group differently 
than members of their own group (Kranton et al., 2018). Identity economics appears to be 
the major cause for the results seen in the two group treatments. This experiment 
showcases the importance of identity in economic outcomes (Akerlof and Kranton, 2011). 
The results are consistent with the communication effect Abatayo and Lynham 
report, but the effect from groupiness and identity appears even after controlling for the 
management regime of players. Overall, self-managing groups able to communicate and 
select their management regime extract fewer tokens and earn more money. Using only 
the outside managed groups however, we can confirm a difference in total harvests 
unrelated to Abatayo and Lynham’s communication effect of 16.12 tokens and 12.76 
tokens for connected and solitary groups. The difference shows the direct impact of 
groupiness on extraction behavior. Groupiness leads players in outside managed 
connected groups to display more cooperative behavior toward their own group members 
in the smaller groups, by extracting fewer tokens and violating own-group rules less 
frequently. However groupiness also leads players to display non-cooperative behavior 
toward the other connected group, by poaching from the other group’s account. Since the 
poaching levels are higher than the reductions in own-group harvesting, the net effect is 
higher overall harvests than solitary groups report. The effect persists regardless of any 
change in management and communication: connected groups always harvest more than 
solitary groups. There previously had not been analyses of groupiness and “us versus 
them” dynamics in CPRs; I report some of the first findings of the effects. 
Future research can determine specifically why dividing groups lowers outcome 
measures. The losses suffered when a large solitary account was split into two connected 
accounts show connected group management operated at an inappropriate scale. Is 
resource management by many smaller groups suboptimal to management by fewer 
larger groups? Or is the negative impact simply a result of management and 
communication being at an inappropriate scale that did not include all the relevant users 




groupiness. But Chávez et al. (2018) and De Geest et al. (2017) find larger groups than 
ours facing poaching from players outside the group, whom the group cannot 
communicate with, still have difficulties handling the poaching. These results argue in 
favor of the second explanation that the major problem in dividing groups is that each 
new group will no longer contain all the relevant fishers. We also need to replicate this 
experimental procedure with more than 2 connected management areas. The harms of 
poaching and resource overextraction are well known, but issues of scale also extend 
beyond the lab; including in Chilean TURFs (Aburto et al., 2014). While further research 
can replicate my experiment in the field, Chávez et al. (2018) found both Chilean fishers 
in the field and university students behave comparably, suggesting my results also apply 
in the field. Therefore, we need empirical studies on inter-group dynamics to confirm my 
findings.  
Resource management programs like TURFs are a popular solution to 
overharvesting, but it is necessary to show the cure is not worse than the disease. My 
results show instituting local self-management programs can have significant adverse 
outcomes and policy-makers must consider inter-group dynamics when designing such 
programs.  
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Socially Optimal Total Harvest 10 10 
Nash Equilibrium Total Harvest 17.14 17.14 
Socially Optimal Own Group 
Harvest 
10 10 
Nash Equilibrium Own Group 
Harvest 
17.14 8.57 
Socially Optimal Other Group 
Harvest 
NA 0 
Nash Equilibrium Other Group 
Harvest 
NA 8.57 






Surveillance Level Management Cost 
50% 10 Experimental Dollars 
40% 7 Experimental Dollars 
30% 4.5 Experimental Dollars 
20% 2.5 Experimental Dollars 
10% 1 Experimental Dollars 
0% 0 Experimental Dollars 
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(1) (2) (3) 
Solitary Group 20.279*** 19.794*** 16.638*** 
 
(2.159) (2.024) (2.802) 
Self-Managing 9.293*** 9.604*** -1.586 
 
(2.159) (2.033) (3.461) 
Proportion of Group Members 

















































Period -0.315* -0.328* -1.077*** 
 
(0.188) (0.188) (0.265) 
Solitary Group X Self-Managing 
  
6.214 
   
(3.916) 






   
(0.376) 
Constant 31.499*** 34.116*** 38.736*** 
 
(2.137) (5.224) (5.296) 
Observations 1,920 1,920 1,920 
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.086 0.094 
F Statistic 109.562*** 192.656*** 215.154*** 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Random effects regression model results shown with 
per Period profit per player in Experimental Dollars as the dependent variable. Analysis 
is at the individual level. Robust clustered standard errors by group, Cycle, and Session 
are in parentheses. Cycle is included to control for any order or learning effects. Self-
Managing indicates whether subjects can communicate and then vote on the cap and 
surveillance levels of their group account. 'Major:' is a dummy variable indicating the 































2.677*** 0.704 1.052 
  
-2.818*** -2.808*** -2.126*** 
 
(0.451) (0.775) (0.951) 
  
(0.486) (0.500) (0.788) 
         
Self-
Managing 
-2.112*** -1.944*** -0.300 0.387 0.439 -1.919*** -1.883*** -0.072 
 
(0.451) (0.435) (0.717) (0.545) (0.628) (0.486) (0.496) (0.799) 
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Surveillance 
Level of Other 
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Surveillance 














         
Period -0.024 -0.007 0.055 0.202*** 0.148** 0.077*** 0.013 0.099* 
 
(0.035) (0.033) (0.057) (0.050) (0.059) (0.029) (0.033) (0.057) 






    
-1.475 
   
(0.845) 
    
(0.972) 






    
-0.179*** 
   
(0.066) 
    
(0.066) 






    
0.007 
   
(0.066) 
    
(0.066) 
         
Constant 12.501*** 12.548*** 11.861*** 4.190*** 2.517 17.344*** 16.341*** 15.568*** 
 




Observations 1,920 1,728 1,728 960 864 1,920 1,728 1,728 
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.346 0.349 0.015 0.030 0.027 0.032 0.036 
F Statistic 57.555*** 929.540*** 942.911*** 16.649*** 40.122*** 56.382*** 69.332*** 80.093*** 
 
  Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Random effects regression model results shown. Analysis is at the 
individual level. Columns (1), (2), and (3) report regression results for token extraction from your 
own group account as the dependent variable. Columns (4) and (5) report regression results for token 
extraction from the other group's account as the dependent variable. Columns (4) and (5) restrict the 
sample to include only individuals in the connected group treatment, since only those individuals can 
poach. Columns (6), (7), and (8) report regression results for total token extraction from both your 
account and the other group's account (for connected groups) as the dependent variable. 'Lagged' 
indicates the value of the variable in the previous Period. Robust clustered standard errors by group, 
Cycle, and Session are in parentheses. Cycle is included to control for any order or learning effects. 
Self-Managing indicates whether subjects can communicate and then vote on the cap and 
surveillance levels of their group account. 'Major:' is a dummy variable indicating the participant's 


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Solitary Group -1.425 -8.451*** -1.312 3.099 -1.029 
 
(1.214) (2.869) (3.816) (10.878) (11.220) 
Cap 
   
-0.002 -0.004 
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Period -0.055 -0.066 0.421* 0.143 -0.262 
 
(0.064) (0.081) (0.216) (0.272) (0.394) 
Solitary Group X 
Period     
0.755 
     
(0.532) 
Constant 12.221*** 14.119*** 16.684*** 10.890 12.563 
 
(0.928) (3.389) (2.948) (14.126) (14.126) 
Observations 160 144 160 144 144 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.164 0.012 -0.013 -0.005 
F Statistic 2.112 40.965*** 3.916 12.202 14.301 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Random effects regression model results shown. 
Analysis is at the group level and restricted to self-managing groups. Columns (1) and (2) 
report regression results for the harvest cap the group selects as the dependent variable. 
Columns (3), (4), and (5) report regression results for the surveillance level the self-
managing group selects as the dependent variable. 'Lagged' indicates the value of the 
variable in the previous Period. Robust clustered standard errors by group, Cycle and 
Session are in parentheses. Cycle is included to control for any order or learning effects. 
'Major:' is a dummy variable indicating the proportion of group members majoring in that 


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Solitary Group 0.669*** -0.875* -1.056* 1.454*** -0.628 0.339 
 
(0.096) (0.493) (0.567) (0.321) (0.546) (0.765) 
Self-Managing -0.598*** -0.774*** -0.297 -0.392 -0.647** 0.810 
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0.0001 0.044 0.013 -0.004 0.050 
  
(0.021) (0.044) (0.025) (0.027) (0.053) 
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Constant -0.506*** 4.210*** 4.060*** 1.982*** 8.398*** 7.632*** 
 
(0.082) (0.733) (0.758) (0.311) (0.920) (0.950) 
Observations 1,920 1,919 1,919 1,920 1,728 1,728 
Adjusted R2 
   
0.010 0.210 0.219 
Log Likelihood -1,239.873 -936.897 -931.523 
   
F Statistic 
   
22.282*** 472.729*** 501.110*** 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Random effects regression model results shown for 
Columns (4), (5), and (6). Columns (1), (2), and (3) report logistic regressions. Analysis 
is at the individual level. Columns (1), (2), and (3) report logistic regression results for 
whether a subject exceeds the cap for the group account as the dependent variable. 
Columns (4), (5), and (6) report regression results for the amount that the group exceeds 
the cap as the dependent variable. Self-Managing indicates whether subjects can 




indicates the value of the variable in the previous Period. Robust clustered standard errors 
by group, Cycle, and Session are in parentheses. Cycle is included to control for any 
order or learning effects. 'Major:' is a dummy variable indicating the participant's area of 


























Figure 3.5: The relationship between the group treatment and the proportion of group 






CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX 
Complete Original Ownership Analysis 
If the measurement specification changes to encapsulate the entire round 
(bargaining negotiation 1 between A and B, and negotiation 2 between C and the resulting 
owner from negotiation 1), you find similar results as from just analyzing the first 
negotiation’s outcome for all the variables except group size. There are no longer any 
efficiency gains from adding a second taker. The specification from the main paper, just 
analyzing efficiency from the first negotiation between A and B, is preferred because there 
are two opportunities for a taker to take the token in the 3-person treatment but just one in 
the 2-person treatment. More importantly, taker C does not face the recursive mechanism 
of the Bar-Gill and Persico model because there is no taker to claim the token from them. 
The absence of the mechanism means the absence of its efficiency inducing effects. To 
compare efficiency impacts directly it is better to compare the results between just the first 
negotiations. In the interest of completeness though, below are the results from an analysis 
of retained ownership over the entire bargaining round. 
 
 
Figure A2.1. The proportion of original owners of the token who 
maintain possession of the token until the end of the entire round, 
by group size. There is a noticeable difference in efficiency between 
the 2-person treatment groups and the 3-person treatment groups 
with the 3-person groups achieving statistically higher levels of 






Figure A2.2. The proportion of original owners of the token who 
maintain possession of the token until the end of the entire 
bargaining round, by information. The impact of incomplete 
information on efficiency is statistically insignificant when analyzing 
results by the entire bargaining round. 95 percent confidence 
intervals are shown. 
 
Incomplete information on how much the token is worth to your partner does not 
have a significant impact when analyzing over the entire round. The results indicate 
efficiency is 62.22 percent in the 2-person treatments and 75.29 percent in the 3-person 
treatments; and 70.56 percent in the complete information and 66.67 percent in the 
incomplete information treatments. Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests confirm the rates of 
ownership for original possessors are statistically significantly different from the theoretical 
rate of 100 percent. Further Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests confirm the impact of 
complete information is not statistically significant and that the impact of adding a second 
taker is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The second taker brings a relative 
increase in efficiency of 21.01 percent over the 2-person treatment scenario. To compare 
to the analysis of just first negotiation outcomes, there the addition of a second taker 





Figure A2.3. The proportion of original owners of the token who 
maintain possession of the token until the end of the bargaining 
round. Information impairs efficiency in 2-person negotiations, but 
does not impact it significantly in 3-person negotiations. The 
addition of a third party to a bargain increases efficiency in all 
information contexts, but especially within incomplete information 
contexts. Incomplete information results in a reduction in efficiency 
in the 2-person context, but not in the 3-person context. 95 percent 
confidence intervals are shown. 
 
Analyzing the rate of economic efficiency – as measured by the percentage of 
original owners of the token remaining in possession of the token until the end of the 
round – indicates the addition of a second taker to the negotiations improves efficiency, 
especially within the incomplete information treatments. The overall efficiency 
improvements of Figure A2.1 appear to be mostly driven by improvements in the 
incomplete information context. Of original possessors of the token, 66.67 percent 
maintain possession in the 2-person, complete information sessions; 57.78 percent in the 2-
person, incomplete sessions; 74.44 percent in the 3-person, complete information sessions; 
and 76.19 percent in the 3-person, incomplete information sessions (shown in Figure 
A2.3). Incomplete information significantly affects efficiency in the 2-person context, but 
not in the 3-person context. 
 
Equation (A1) presents the model to evaluate whether the original owner of the 
token maintained possession throughout the entire round (1 negotiation in the 2-person 
treatments, 2 negotiations in the 3-person treatments). The model included covariates for 
the group size treatment and information completeness. s other explanatory variables are 
included to control for other factors that affect decisions: the proposal offered by player B 
to A; a dummy variable for if the proposal is higher than the value of the token; a variable 




session the negotiation is in; the number of economic experiments the subject had 
participated in previously; and the negotiators’ gender and major. 
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The results from a regression using Equation (A1) are reported in Table A2.1. 
Column (1) reports the basic regression of ownership on the group-size and information 
treatments. Column (2) reports a regression using Equation (A1), while Column (3) reports 
a regression using Equation (A1) plus a control covariate indicating the player’s CRT score. 
Column (3) only uses people who completed the CRT in less than 90 seconds. 
 






(1) (2) (3) 
 
 
3-Person Treatment 0.608*** 0.443* 0.153 
 (0.165) (0.238) (0.280) 
Incomplete Information -0.172 -0.414* -0.551* 
 (0.163) (0.229) (0.305) 
3-Person Treatment - 0.399 0.829* 
     X Incomplete Information  (0.339) (0.450) 
Proposal - -0.051*** -0.065*** 
 
 (0.011) (0.014) 
High Proposal - 1.127*** 1.320*** 
 
 (0.346) (0.446) 
Round - 0.301*** 0.378*** 
 
 (0.103) (0.132) 
Cycle - -0.144 -0.065 
  (0.173) (0.225) 
Experience - -0.117** -0.107 
 
 (0.047) (0.141) 
Gender (1=Female) - -0.071 -0.046 
  (0.173) (0.228) 
Max Time to Comprehension - -0.000 -0.000 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) 




  (0.300) (0.402) 
UG Major: Biology - 0.050 -0.045 
  (0.213) (0.287) 
Proportion CRT Correct - - -1.005 
   (0.952) 
Constant 0.588
*** 1.645*** 1.867*** 
 (0.137) (0.448) (0.584) 
Observations 708 708 441 
AIC 871.38 844.11 527.37 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Logit regression. Clustered standard errors by the subject, cycle, and 
session are in parentheses. The unit of observation is at the subject level by session and cycle, and is 
considered repeated for all observations within a session and cycle. Column (1) gives the regression of 
whether the owner possesses the token after an entire round on the covariates of group size and information 
treatments. Column (2) reports the results of a regression based on Equation A1. Column (3) reports the 
preferred model of a regression (Equation A1) with a dummy variable for whether the original owner of the 
token maintains ownership of the token after the entire round as the dependent variable and controlling for 
CRT score. Participants who do not complete the CRT within 90 seconds are removed from the sample for 
the regression reported in Column (3).The 3-Person Treatment covariate is a dummy variable for if the 
subject is in the 3-subject sized group treatment. The Incomplete Information covariate is a dummy variable 
for if the subject is in the incomplete information treatment. Proposal indicates the bribe proposal offered by 
player B to A, and High Proposal is a dummy variable for if that proposal is higher than the value of the token 
to the original owner (30 Experimental Dollars). Experience, Gender, and UG Major control for demographic 
factors such as how many previous economic experiments the player has participated in, their gender, and 
their undergraduate major (Biology and Environmental and Natural Resource Economics are controlled for 
because of concerns the programs’ curricula would bias participants of those majors). Round and Cycle 
indicate the round of a cycle and the cycle of the session in which the proposal took place. Max Time to 
Comprehension indicates the longest time for a subject to correctly answer the comprehension questions 
between the owner of the token and the taker of the token. Proportion CRT Correct indicates the proportion of 
the 3 CRT questions the participant answered correctly. 
 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table A2.1 indicate efficiency gains from the addition of a 
second taker to the bargaining. However the coefficients on the addition are attenuated as 
compared to those of Table 2.1 in the main paper. The output in Column (3) does not 
have any statistically significant impact from the addition of a second taker. This contrasts 
the results in Table 2.1. Besides the impacts from the treatments, the size of the proposal 
offered (both the continuous variable and the High Proposal dummy variable) and the 
round of the negotiation impact efficiency. Additionally the incomplete information and 
the interaction between incomplete information and an additional taker are significant. The 
proposal variables and round variable are also significant in Table 2.1. Since an analysis of 
the entire round includes the second negotiation, where there is not another negotiation 
afterwards with a taker for C to contend with, the mechanism of Bar-Gill and Persico is 
significantly hampered. Therefore a reduction in the effect from adding a second taker is 
not surprising. The effect disappears in Column (3) probably because the CRT model only 




specification selects for skilled individuals, and skilled individuals would be the most likely 
to notice the absence of Bar-Gill and Persico’s mechanism for C. 
 
First Cycle Analysis 
To examine if there are any learning effects, only the results from the first cycle 
people participated in are presented. The results indicate similar qualitative patterns – 
increasing the number of takers from 2 to 3 improves economic efficiency, but 100 percent 
economic efficiency is not achieved, and there is an insignificant efficiency impact from 
information completeness – but the results presented in the main paper are attenuated 
here. 
 
Figure A2.4: The proportion of original owners of the token who 
maintain possession of the token after the end of the first bargaining 
negotiation in the first cycle in which they participated. The 2-
person treatments consist of one such negotiation, the 3-person 
treatments consist of two sequential negotiations. There are no 
impacts from information, and information does not significantly 
interact with group size treatments. Adding an additional party to the 
bargain increases efficiency, as found for the complete sample. 95 
percent confidence intervals are shown. 
 
Only examining data from the first cycle people played (Figure A2.4) gives similar 
results to Figure 2.4; except the proportion of original owners maintaining possession in the 
first cycle is higher for 2-person groups under incomplete information than it was in the 
complete sample. The loss in efficiency must be driven by behavior in the second cycle. 
This idea is explored in Figure A2.5. There information is a significant factor in the 2-
person treatments, but not in the 3-person treatments. There do not appear to be 




Figure A2.4 and A2.5 is a reduction in efficiency in the 2-person treatments under 
incomplete information in the second cycle comparing to the first cycle. Both Figure A2.4 
and A2.5 show a significant improvement in efficiency with the addition of a second taker. 
The efficiency improvement occurs in both information contexts. 
 
Figure A2.5: The proportion of original owners of the token who 
maintain possession of the token after the end of the first bargaining 
negotiation in the second cycle in which they participated. The 2-
person treatments consist of one such negotiation, the 3-person 
treatments consist of two sequential negotiations. 95 percent 
confidence intervals are shown. Incomplete information reduces 
efficiency in the 2-person groups, but has no significant effect in the 
3-person groups. Adding an additional party improves efficiency in 
all information contexts, but especially within the incomplete 
information context. 
 
Table A2.2: Proposal Analysis (Only Cycle 1) 
 Dependent variable: 
 Proposal 
 (1) (2) 
3-Person Treatment 4.331 1.720 
 (4.193) (4.992) 
Incomplete Information  -2.317 -13.969** 
 (4.510) (6.540) 
3-Person Treatment 2.343 16.321 
     X Incomplete Information (6.851) (9.886) 
Proportion CRT Correct - -15.501 




UG Major: Biology 7.76* -7.776* 
 (3.996) (3.996) 
Observations 153 98 
Adjusted R2 0.0.37 0.070 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Ordinary least squares regression. Clustered standard errors by the 
subject, cycle, and session are in parentheses. The unit of observation is at the subject level by session and 
cycle, and is considered repeated for all observations within a session and cycle. Reports a regression with 
the proposal made in the first negotiation as the dependent variable. The controls for (1) and (2) are the 
same as those reported in Table 2.3 Column (1) and Column (2). (2) includes all controls and CRT score 
while (1) does not include CRT score. We only report the coefficients on statistically significant variables 
from Table 2.3 here. Only observations from the first cycle of each session are reported, to identify 
learning effects. 
 
Table A2.2 finds an impact from incomplete information in the first cycle. In the 
first cycle first takers ask for significantly lower bribes than they do in cycle 2. Table A2.2 
indicates learning effects occur for some populations in the experiment. The effect of CRT 
score found in the model controlling for CRT (Table 2.3 Column (2)) is absent in the first 
cycle. People who complete the CRT in time experience learning effects as the session 
progresses and the significant coefficient of Table 2.3 is driven by their proposals in the 
second cycle. In cycle 2 first takers offer significantly lower bribe proposals. The effect 
from the biology program of study is similar. Interestingly in the first cycle subjects who do 
not complete the CRT in time drive a sign change in the coefficient on biology from the 
value Column (2) reports and the values Table 2.3 reports in Columns (1) and (2) to the 
value shown in Column (1) of Table A2.2. The group size treatment effect is also absent in 
both models. 
 
Table A2.3: First Negotiation Ownership Analysis (Only Cycle 1) 
 Dependent variable: 
 Original Ownership (First Negotiation) 
 (1) 
3-Person Group 1.380*** 
 (0.522)  
Incomplete Information -0.376 
 (0.529) 
3-Person Group 0.384 
     X Incomplete Information (0.803) 
Proposal -0.079*** 
 (0.024) 









Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Logit regression. Clustered standard errors by the subject, cycle, and 
session are in parentheses. The unit of observation is at the subject level by session and cycle, and is 
considered repeated for all observations within a session and cycle. Column (1) reports the coefficients on 
the group-size treatment effect and on information incompleteness from the preferred model for a 
regression of whether the original owner of the token maintained ownership of the token after the first 
negotiation for only the first cycle. The controls are the same as those in Column (3) of Table 2.1. Column 
(1) controls for the CRT score and only people who completed the CRT within 90 seconds are included in 
the sample. A dummy variable indicating whether the original possessor of the token maintains ownership 
after the first negotiation is the dependent variable. The sample for Column (3) includes only observations 
from the first cycle of each experiment session. 
 
Table A2.3 supports the finding that the addition of a second taker waiting to take 
at the next negotiation improves economic efficiency in negotiations between an owner and 
a first taker. The results are shown for the model that controls for CRT score. The results 
for the complete sample are similar but are omitted for brevity. The coefficient on the 3-
person treatment dummy variable is comparable to that on the same variable in the model 
which includes data from both cycles (1.436, also significant at the 1 percent level). 
 
High Proposal Analysis 
A similar analysis to that reported in Table 2.3 looks at the offering of a proposal to 
not take the token that is higher than the token is worth to the original owner. Regression 
analysis does not identify any significant variables (Appendix Table A2.4). Descriptive 
figures similar to those in the main paper are included (Appendix Figures A2.6-A2.8). The 
results suggest incomplete information does not cause people to more frequently propose 
more than the token is worth. 
 
Table A2.4 shows the results for a model that controls for CRT score (Column 2) 
and a model which does not (Column 1). A statistically significant impact from all 
covariates except experience is absent in Column (2). The more experience you have with 
economic experiments the more you propose bribes higher than the value of the token to 
the owner. 
Table A2.4: High Proposal Analysis 
 Dependent variable: 
 High Proposal 
 (1) (2) 
3-Person Group 0.701* 0.160 
 (0.418) (0.498) 
Incomplete Information 0.746** 0.530 
 (0.367) (0.452) 
3-Person Group -0.423 -0.252 
     X Incomplete Information (0.532) (0.677) 




 (0.275) (0.615) 
Gender (1=Female) 0.058 0.210 
 (0.286) (0.654) 
Round 0.128 0.260 
 (0.166) (0.224) 
Experience -0.071 0.434** 
 (0.083) (0.215) 
UG Major: Biology -0.431 -0.468 
 (0.348) (0.468) 
UG Major: ENRE 0.445 -0.429 
 (0.481) (0.661) 
Comprehension 0.002** 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Constant -1.854*** 2.506*** 
 (0.682) (0.919) 
Observations 267 153 
AIC 330.55 201.41 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Logit Regression. Clustered standard errors by the subject, cycle, and 
session are in parentheses. The unit of observation is at the subject level by session and cycle, and is 
considered repeated for all observations within a session and cycle. Observations are the proposals offered 
by taker B to owner A. Reports a regression with whether the proposal made in the first negotiation is 
higher than the value of the token to the owner as the dependent variable. The other controls are the same 
as those reported in Table 2.3 Columns (1) and (2). Comprehension indicates how long it took the subjects 
to complete the game comprehension questions at the beginning of the experiment. As in Table 2.3 
Column (2) people who do not complete the CRT within 90 seconds are removed from the sample in 
Column (2). 
 
Figures A2.6 and A2.7 show the treatment effects on whether subjects propose 
more to not take the token than the token is worth. While Figure A2.7 indicates an effect 
from information, the effect disappears once clustered standard errors by the subject, cycle, 
and session are included. Figure A2.8 does not indicate any interaction effects between the 






Figure A2.6. The proportion of proposals to not take the token that 
are above the value of the token to the original owner, by group size. 
Only results for the first negotiations are shown. The 3-person 
group treatments have higher proportions of high proposals offered, 
but the difference is only statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level. 95 percent confidence intervals are shown. 
 
 
Figure A2.7. The proportion of proposals to not take the token 
above the value of the token to the original owner, by information. 
The incomplete information treatments have statistically significant 
higher proportions of high proposals being offered. 95 percent 






Figure A2.8: The proportion of proposals made to not take the token 
that are greater than the value of the token, by group size and 
information treatments. The Figure shows similar results to those 
found in A2.6 and A2.7. There are not significant interaction effects 
between information context and group size. 95 percent confidence 
intervals are shown. 
 
Proposal Behavior 
 Bribe proposals fall within the range predicted by the Bar-Gill and Persico model 
and the experiment’s design,  0 < '^, ≤ 30.  
Proposal behavior is impacted by the completeness of information. Appendix 
Figure A2.9, reports proposals of people under complete information and people under 
incomplete information. The pattern of bribe proposals we expect to see is closely followed 
in the complete information treatment. The expected pattern is smoothed under 
incomplete information, intuitively because under incomplete information it is more 









Figure A2.9. The bribes proposed by takers to owners. Dark gray are the bribes proposed by B players and 
the light gray are the bribes proposed by C players. There are necessarily twice as many B proposals as C 
proposals because the 2-person treatments consist of one negotiation (B and A) and the 3-person treatments 
consist of two sequential negotiations (B and A, then C and A/B). The predicted range of bribes for the 
parameters used is between 0 and 30 Experimental Dollars. 
 
Subject Fixed Effects 
A final consideration for the analysis is including subject fixed effects. The results 
from incorporating subject fixed effects for the proposal and round 1 ownership analyses of 
the main paper are reported below. Information is not included as a covariate because the 
completeness of information did not vary for subjects. The coefficients of interest are of the 
same direction and comparable significance to those in the main paper.  




Round 1 Ownership 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
3-Person Group 0.238*** 0.203*** 0.168*** 
 
(0.032) (0.044) (0.051) 
3-Person Group - 0.061 0.126 
     X Incomplete Information  (0.063) (0.082) 
Proposal - -0.011*** -0.012*** 
  
(0.002) (0.003) 
High Proposal - 0.279*** 0.265*** 
  
(0.071) (0.090) 
Round - 0.036* 0.040* 
  
(0.019) (0.023) 
Cycle - -0.026 -0.020 
  
(0.032) (0.040) 
Max Time to Comprehension - -0.000 -0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 708 708 441 
Adjusted R2 -0.099 -0.052 -0.035 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Logit regression. Clustered standard errors by the subject, cycle, and 
session are in parentheses. The unit of observation is at the subject level. Subject fixed effects are 
accounted for. Column (1) gives the regression of whether the owner possesses the token after the first 
bargain on the covariates of group size and information treatments. Column (2) reports the results of a 
regression based on Equation 7 except for the addition of subject fixed effects. Column (3) reports the 
preferred model of a regression with a dummy variable for whether the original owner of the token 
maintains ownership of the token after the first negotiation as the dependent variable and controlling for 
CRT score. Subjects who do not complete the CRT within 90 seconds are removed from the sample in 
Column (3).The 3-Person Treatment covariate is a dummy variable for if the subject is in the 3-subject 
sized group treatment. Information is not included as a covariate because it did not vary for subjects. 




if that proposal is higher than the value of the token to the original owner. Round and Cycle indicate the 
round of a cycle and the cycle of the session in which the proposal took place. Max Time to 
Comprehension indicates the longest time for a subject to correctly answer the comprehension questions 
between the owner of the token and the taker of the token.  
 
Table A2.5 reports similar qualitative findings to those of Table 2.1, but Table 
A2.6 does not find group size to be a significant predictor of the size of bribe proposals 
takers offer to owners. The same finding of the main paper. 
 







3-Person Group 2.839 0.139 
 
(1.964) (2.234) 
3-Person Group -1.512 2.261 
     X Incomplete Information (2.937) (3.764) 
Round 0.658 0.719 
 
(0.915) (1.130) 
Cycle -0.008 -1.458 
 
(0.009) (3.487) 
Observations 267 153 
Adjusted R2 -0.684 -0.739 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Ordinary least squares regression accounting for subject fixed effects. 
Clustered standard errors by the subject, cycle, and session are in parentheses. The unit of observation is at 
the subject. Reports a regression with the proposal made in the first negotiation as the dependent variable. 
The controls for (1) and (2) are the same as those reported in Table 2.3 Column (1) and Column (2) 
however only the treatment and time variables are included. The remaining variables either disappear with 
the addition of fixed effects (such as demographic variables) or are not shown because they were not 
significant in Table 2.3. (2) includes all controls and CRT score while (1) does not include CRT score. 
 
Distribution Impacts 
A further interesting aspect of the Bar-Gill and Persico model is the distribution of 
wealth. With strong property rights, the original owners would receive 30 Experimental 
Dollars, while takers receive nothing. In the experiment I find the average bribe paid to 
takers is 20.29 Experimental Dollars. The benefits of the token are spread between the 
takers and the owners. There is not a statistically significant impact from information 
completeness, but the presence of a second taker does substantially reduce the money the 
original owner receives at the end of the bargaining (Tables A2.7 and A2.8). The increased 
efficiency we find is bought by the original owners of the token. The bribing by the owners 













Original Owner 11.33 13.80 7.78 
Taker 1 19.57 16.20 23.81 
Taker 2 21.02 - 21.02 
 
 




 End Profit 
 
(1) (2) 
Round 1.696 1.696 
 
(1.124) (1.124) 
Cycle 0.859 0.859 
 
(19.287) (19.287) 
Experience -2.097 -2.097 
 (1.962) (1.962) 
Comprehension 0.021 0.021 
 
(0.056) (0.056) 
Max Time to Comprehension -0.012 -0.012 
 
(0.011) (0.011) 
Gender (1=Female) -0.634 -0.634 
 
(12.951) (12.951) 
UG Major: Biology 5.364 5.364 
 
(12.270) (12.270) 
UG Major: ENRE -17.511 -17.511 
 
(19.820) (19.820) 





Original owner x -0.857 -0.857 
2-Person Treatment x Complete Information (4.046) (4.046) 
Original Owner x -8.118* -8.118* 
3-Person Treatment x Complete Information (4.692) (4.692) 
Taker 1 x 3-Person Treatment x Complete Information 4.580 4.580 
 
(4.254) (4.254) 




2-Person Treatment x Incomplete Information (4.066) (4.066) 
Original Owner x -18.147*** -18.147*** 
3-Person Treatment x Incomplete Information (3.980) (3.980) 
Taker 1 x 3-Person Treatment x Incomplete Information 0.678 0.678 
 
(3.986) (3.986) 
Constant 5.224 5.224 
 
(46.318) (46.318) 
Observations 430 430 
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.095 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Ordinary least squares regression. Clustered standard errors by the 
subject, cycle, and session are in parentheses. The unit of observation is at the subject level by session and 
cycle, and is considered repeated for all observations within a session and cycle. Reports a regression with 
the profit made by an individual at the end of the negotiation set as the dependent variable. Column (1) is a 
model including all subjects, while Column (2) reports results only using subjects who finished the CRT in 
time. 3-Person Treatment is a dummy variable for whether the subjects are in a cycle where they had 2 
other members in their group. Incomplete Information is a dummy variable for whether the subjects are in a 
session where the available information is incomplete. Round and Cycle indicate the round of the cycle and 
the cycle of the session in which the proposal took place. Comprehension indicates how long it took the 
subjects to complete the game comprehension questions at the beginning of the experiment. UG major: 
indicates the participant’s area of study with “Other” as the base. Experience indicates how many previous 
economic experiments the subject had participated in previously. Proportion CRT Correct indicates the 
proportion of the 3 CRT questions the participant answered correctly. 
 
